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Director’s introduction 
With the increasing demand for Australian seafood in overseas markets and an expanding 
domestic market, the fishing industry needs to ensure that resources are harvested in  
a sustainable manner so that fish stocks are maintained and the industry is kept viable. 
Although small by world standards, the fishing industry is important to Australia because  
of the number of people it employs, either directly or indirectly, and the considerable export 
earnings that come from it. There are about 80,000 people directly employed in the seafood 
industry and in 2002–03 the export value of Australian seafood product was $1.85 billion.
Efforts to protect Australia’s fisheries from overexploitation include preventing illegal 
harvesting and trade in fish products. Within the Australian domestic fishing industry there 
has always been some illegal activity but this is thought to be low level non-compliance with 
fishing regulations which is small scale and opportunistic. The majority of recreational fishers 
are believed to be compliant although there appears to be some organised illegal activity. 
This is often family based and involves cash or barter transactions.
In contrast to the occasional and lower level non-compliance with fisheries regulations that 
occurs within the recreational, commercial and subsistence sectors there is a small but 
significant group of habitual offenders who deliberately and regularly flout the regulations  
for their own profit or benefit. Some organised criminal activity is already evident in high 
value, low volume fisheries such as abalone, and with illegally obtained shark fins.
Although the Australian fisheries management arrangements currently in place may  
be effective in minimising the risk of low level illegal activity, there is widespread concern 
among fisheries officers that the current regulatory environment is not adequate to deal  
with and prevent organised criminal activity. Effective fisheries management arrangements  
to address organised and cross-border crime depend on the legislation and regime of 
penalties, having appropriate policing methods and powers, and cooperative arrangements 
between agencies.
The Australian Institute of Criminology was commissioned in 2004 by the Australian 
Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry to report on criminal activity 
in the Australian fishing industry, and to examine ways of protecting the sector against 
increased and more organised criminal activity. The research includes a review of the 
literature and of Australian legislation, consultations with key stakeholders, a national  
survey of fisheries officers and analysis of prosecution and court outcome data from four 
jurisdictions. The results suggest that more serious criminal activity may be occurring but  
is rarely being brought before the courts, and that future preventative and investigative 
initiatives will require additional resources and skills development.
Toni Makkai 
Director 
Australian Institute of Criminology
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Abbreviations 
ACC Australian Crime Commission
AFP Australian Federal Police
AFMA Australian Fisheries Management Authority
AFZ Australian fishing zone
COC Chinese organised crime. Could also be known as Eurasian organised crime, 
which would include, for example, crime groups from a range of Asian and 
European countries
DAFF Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
DIMA Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
FATF Financial Action Task Force
FSU Former Soviet Union
IUU Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing
KGW King George whiting
OMCG Outlaw motor cycle gangs
RFE Russian Far East
TRAFFIC Wildlife trade monitoring network
VMS Vessel monitoring systems
xKey terms 
Fishing industry  Includes those involved in the taking, processing or transporting  
of fish as both licensed and unlicensed operators in the commercial, recreational and 
Indigenous sectors
Money laundering  ‘[T]he goal of a large number of criminal acts is to generate a profit for  
the individual or group that carries out the act. Money laundering is the processing of these 
criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin. This process is of critical importance, as it 
enables the criminal to enjoy these profits without jeopardising their source.’(Financial Action 
Task Force 2003)
Organised crime  Refers to known organised crime or other criminal groups engaged  
in illegal fishing activities in all its aspects, for example, illegal catch, illegal processing,  
illegal distribution
Organised crime in Australia’s fishing industry  Defined in the survey questionnaire  
as being a structured group of three or more persons, who work together with the purpose 
of committing a serious offence
xi
Executive summary
The Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry commissioned 
the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) in 2004 to determine the extent and nature of 
criminal activity in the fishing industry and to assess current capacity to respond to this 
activity. The project was undertaken in conjunction with the Australian Crime Commission 
(ACC), which had the principal task of undertaking an intelligence assessment of organised 
criminal involvement in the industry, the results of which are reported independently.
The research by the AIC involved a review of the literature and of Australian legislation, 
consultations with key stakeholders, a national survey of fisheries officers and analysis  
of prosecution and court outcome data from four jurisdictions.
The results of the research are summarised under the terms of reference for the project.
The extent to which organised crime  
has infiltrated the Australian fishing industry
Some measure of noncompliance in the fishing sector has always been present, although 
only a small proportion could be characterised as high level systematic or organised criminal 
activity. The national survey of fisheries officers found that the majority believed that, in their 
district, less than 20 percent of the fishing industry (defined in the study as including 
commercial, recreational and Indigenous sectors) was involved in fishing-related crime.  
Both the consultations and the results from the national survey of fisheries officers suggest 
that only a fraction of illegal activity is believed to be linked to organised crime (defined in  
the survey as being a structured group of three or more persons who work together with  
the purpose of committing a serious offence).
There was, however, the perception by officers that organised criminal activity was more 
common across a state or territory, in comparison to the level they believed existed at the 
local level. Except for a small number of fisheries officers who did not know, all the fisheries 
officers agreed that organised criminal activity was present to some degree across the 
fishing industry in their jurisdiction – 26 percent said there was a lot, 58 percent said there 
was some and 14 percent said there was a little. In addition, over half of the officers believed 
their district was indirectly affected by this activity, with 58 percent of them believing that 
their district was a transit point for the movement interstate or overseas of illegal fish or  
fish product.
The number of fisheries officers who did not know the answer to questions increased as 
more detailed information was sought about the nature of the organised criminal activity. For 
example, 28 percent of the officers did not know whether organised criminal activity in their 
district involved other illegal commodities. Along with the types of offences and penalties 
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evident in the prosecution and court outcome data, this suggests that fisheries officers 
primarily have contact with opportunistic or small scale fisheries crime.
There was widespread concern among key stakeholders about the potential vulnerability  
of the sector as a whole to infiltration by organised crime groups. Nearly all fisheries officers 
surveyed believed that the type of criminal activity encountered by fisheries enforcement 
agencies had changed over the past five years. Stakeholder concern about the level of 
vulnerability may be linked to the changes in the type of criminal activity being encountered 
by fisheries enforcement agencies in their day-to-day work.
The potential vulnerability of the fishing sector was perceived to increase as specific fish 
stocks increased in value, especially if there were lucrative overseas markets. Some 
organised criminal activity is already evident in high value, low volume fisheries such  
as abalone, and with illegally obtained shark fins.
The consultations revealed that a far wider range of species may be vulnerable to 
exploitation including mud crabs, native and coral fish, marine scale, the extended  
seahorse family, eel, bêche de mer (otherwise known as trepang or sea slug/sea 
cucumbers,) and the sea urchin. Three main species were identified as vulnerable  
to organised criminal activity in the national survey – rock lobster (by 63% of officers), 
abalone (by 62% of officers) and shark (by 57% of officers).
A range of factors were identified by stakeholders that make the fishing industry vulnerable 
to various types of organised criminal exploitation. The sector comprises many small 
business ventures, subject to seasonal fishing fluctuations and competition from seafood 
imports that create financial pressures. In addition, illicit drug use is not uncommon in some 
sectors of the workforce and this might also precipitate involvement in other illicit criminal 
activity, such as poaching fish and the distribution of illicit drugs. 
According to many stakeholders, the large majority of recreational fishers are believed to  
be compliant. However they also noted there was some organised illegal activity among 
recreational fishers, particularly among ethnically and culturally based family groups. This 
form of organised activity was a means of providing extra household cash through selling 
fish to domestic businesses, such as fish and chip shops, restaurants, cafes, hotels, clubs, 
or through bartering the fish for services in kind.
There are many types of illegal activities which may occur in the commercial sector 
including:
non-reporting or under-reporting catch
co-mingling legal with illegal catch
selling commercial catch to clubs, cafes, restaurants, hotels, or private individuals
•
•
•
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taking in excess of the allowable quota
swapping catch between commercial and recreational quota. 
Fisheries officers in the survey indicated that the most common strategies employed to 
avoid detection were the use of concealed spaces in boats and vehicles and counter 
surveillance. They also believed that illegal fishers were more likely to pose as legitimate 
recreational fishers than as commercial fishers.
The undermining of fisheries management arrangements
The literature review highlighted how contemporary organised crime groups operate:
they are fluid
they have large funds at their disposal to put towards the day-to-day expenses 
surrounding their operations, paying off corrupt officials or other business expenses
they are able to utilise various methods to transfer funds internationally
they are not averse to using violence, if required
they network informally with other crime groups domestically and internationally  
to facilitate particular activities.
Other countries’ experiences provide evidence of the adverse consequences of organised 
crime groups on fisheries and the wider environment, including trade in other illegal 
commodities and illicitly obtained resources, violence, corruption, fraud and money 
laundering. More direct social and economic damage to the fisheries industry and 
compliance agencies by illicit activity includes threats to officers’ safety, destruction of 
habitat, unsustainable fishing practices, and the undermining of legitimate business interests 
involved in domestic and export markets through unfair competition and poor standards  
of seafood safety.
Although Australian fisheries management arrangements currently in place may be working 
well in terms of minimising the risk of low level illegal activity, the consultations found that 
many stakeholders lack confidence in the current regulatory environment to deal with and 
prevent organised criminal activity. The national survey of fisheries officers revealed just 
under half of the officers (40%) believed their state/territory to be effective in dealing with 
organised criminal activity, while 45 percent believed their state/territory to be ineffective. 
Effective fisheries management arrangements to address organised and cross-border  
crime depend on:
fisheries legislation and the regime of penalties
appropriate policing methods and powers
cooperative arrangements between agencies.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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The adequacy and effectiveness of each of these key areas, specifically in relation to 
organised criminal activity, was investigated during the research and, although jurisdictional 
differences emerged during the research, for example where fisheries enforcement and 
compliance is the responsibility of the police services in the Northern Territory and Tasmania, 
the results have been summarised as a national overview.
The adequacy of penalties as a deterrent
Consultations with key stakeholders revealed that many believed their legislation had 
inadequate penalty provisions for serious criminal activity. Several jurisdictions are 
considering introducing a similar provision to Victoria, which recently introduced the 
indictable offence of trafficking with serious penalties attached to conviction.
Even where there are more severe penalties for particular offences, some stakeholders 
doubted that the courts would impose such penalties. Prosecution and court outcome data 
show that many matters were undefended, that a very small fraction of court outcomes 
resulted in a serious penalty, and that the majority of offenders were given relatively minor 
fines. In Queensland for example, the average fine was $1,312, with 51 percent of fines less 
than $500. Such fines are unlikely to deter offenders making a substantial profit from their 
illegal activities. For commercial fishers, the suspension, revocation or adjustment of licences 
or the confiscation of assets may act as a greater disincentive than the prospect of a fine.
Criminological research on deterrence has consistently demonstrated that the likelihood of 
detection and apprehension acts as greater deterrent than the punishment that might be 
exacted. In relation to deterring organised criminal activity, the organisational factors of 
personal safety and the number of officers were rated in the national survey as the most 
important by 71 percent of fisheries officers. Arguably, officers who feel safer, whether by 
dint of numbers and/or the provision of protective and other equipment, might feel more 
capable of dealing with the potential dangers of organised criminals. Organised criminals in 
turn might appreciate that officers thus equipped would constitute a greater deterrence than 
at present. Other factors were rated highly, with nearly two thirds of officers rating legislation, 
interagency cooperation and surveillance capacity as very important.
The extent of national consistency of legislative approaches
From the stakeholder consultations, it was apparent that there are regulatory differences 
across jurisdictions for commercial fisheries and recreational fishing related to licensing and 
quota arrangements, and the quantity, size and sex of specified fish stocks. In addition, 
much of the fisheries legislation in Australia is viewed as complex and complicated, with the 
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national review of fisheries legislation revealing many differences across jurisdictions.  
The differences were also highlighted during consultations and included:
nature of offences and regulatory requirements
penalty regimes
reverse onus of proof
assets confiscation
powers of officers e.g. arrest, search and seizure.
To achieve greater consistency and to increase capacity to combat systematic criminal 
activity, the followed areas could be reviewed:
the distinction between recreational and commercial fishers in terms of the commission 
of offences
the distinction made in legislation between the taking of fish and the possession of fish
introduction of an offence of trafficking in all jurisdictions, with the offence potentially 
including processing plants, wholesalers and retailers through which or to whom fish  
are dispatched
the ambit of the governing legislation (in terms of regulatory requirements) in terms of 
whether it allows officers the time to deal effectively with serious and organised crime  
as well as more routine regulatory issues such as licensing requirements
the extent and availability of powers granted to fisheries, including power of arrest, 
power of entry and search of properties, and power of search and seizure
the link between the nature and severity of the penalty regime to the perceived or actual 
seriousness of the offences
financial penalty regimes, with jurisdictions differing in terms of fines and expiation fees, 
and penalty units
the provision for automatic bans (for both licensed commercial and unlicensed fishers) 
from certain types of fishing activity or fishing areas, or loss or adjustment of licences.
Adequacy of current fisheries compliance  
organisation and enforcement effort
From the consultations it was apparent that many stakeholders believed that they were 
successful in detecting and prosecuting many minor infractions. However, the national 
survey found nearly half of the fisheries officers believed that their jurisdiction was ineffective 
in detecting organised criminal activity, and 45 percent believed that their jurisdiction was 
ineffectual in dealing with organised criminal activity once it was detected.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Fisheries officers are responsible for ensuring that activities which impact on the efficient 
management of the fisheries environment are prevented and/detected and mitigated. The 
majority of fisheries officers are not likely to possess the expertise to tackle, and/or have 
direct experience in tackling, organised crime. That fisheries organisations will require 
additional resources, training and specialist staff to deal with organised criminal activity  
was recognised by fisheries officers in the national survey. The personal safety and skills 
base of officers, intelligence, dedicated investigators and analysts, and financial and  
human resources rated highly as very important factors in monitoring and dealing with 
organised crime.
There was evident widespread concern for the personal safety of officers confronted by 
serious criminals. Thirty-seven percent of officers indicated that they operated in an unsafe 
or very unsafe environment. An important issue may be the level and type of protection 
provided to fisheries officers, with stakeholder consultations revealing differences across 
jurisdictions in whether they were allowed to wear protective vests and carry pepper spray 
or batons.
Although not rated as a priority by fisheries officers, promising initiatives that might help 
enforcement efforts included educational campaigns for both the community and the 
judiciary. The environmental court introduced in South Africa has an important role in 
educating and training fisheries and police officers, investigators and prosecutors.
The need for enhanced traditional policing methods
Although key stakeholders indicated that reviews of legislation related to offences, penalties 
and police powers were already underway in some jurisdictions, the fisheries officers’ survey 
highlighted that more needed to be done in relation to legislation, powers for fisheries 
officers and cooperation between agencies. These three factors emerged as the most 
important factors that, from the officers’ point of view, would enhance compliance and 
capacity to deal with organised criminal activity.
Collaboration between agencies can be an important means by which expertise and 
information are shared. Intra-jurisdictional collaboration between agencies was viewed  
as effective by most fisheries officers, while multi-jurisdictional collaboration was less likely  
to be rated as effective, particularly when non-fisheries agencies were involved.
The sharing of information about fisheries-related criminal activity was more likely to be 
frequent in the case of state police and fisheries agencies and the Australian Fisheries 
Management Authority. According to the fisheries officers the majority of Australian 
Government agencies, such as the Australian Federal Police (AFP), the ACC, and the 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, infrequently referred information about 
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criminal activity to their agency. The exception was Customs, with 28 percent of officers 
saying information was referred frequently or sometimes.
Several key barriers to the sharing of information were identified by fisheries officers –  
lack of formal agreements by 71 percent of officers, unwillingness to share information  
by 60 percent of officers, uncertainty about the information being kept confidential by  
59 percent of officers, and lack of uniform data storage system by 58 percent of officers.  
In relation to formal agreements, key stakeholders have indicated that several jurisdictions 
are seeking to work more cooperatively with other agencies through formal agreements. 
However, such agreements may not address the issue raised during consultations of 
fisheries officers being unable to access existing intelligence data about organised  
criminal networks and activities.
More resources may be required to enhance an intelligence led policing approach to 
organised criminal activity. It seems there is no systematic collection of intelligence across 
jurisdictions, despite improvements in secure data holdings at a jurisdictional level. This 
means there is no national monitoring of the organised criminal activity in the fishing industry 
or of enforcement efforts in terms of recording of prosecutions and court outcomes. 
However, improved cooperation and more systematic and consistent recording of data 
across jurisdictions will result in a more effective and targeted approach to enforcement  
and prevention.
The benefits of developing future cooperation  
between fisheries and police agencies
Future cooperation between agencies could take many forms including multi-agency  
or bilateral cooperation within jurisdictions, or cross border and international cooperation  
to create:
operational taskforces
effective sharing of intelligence and information.
The benefits of cooperation through taskforces and special operations within Australia,  
and of international links to combat transnational criminal activities, are demonstrated by  
the success of operations in other countries as well as Australia. Fisheries agencies in South 
Africa, Canada and New Zealand have taken advantage of specialist police equipment and 
officers trained in covert activities for one-off or ongoing assistance in operations. Increased 
cooperation between fisheries and police agencies brought about benefits such as improved 
morale; greater efficiency, including more targeted use of resources; a better educated 
workforce; and an improved success rate in dealing with organised crime activity in the 
fishing industry.
•
•
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Other examples of successful multi-agency and international collaboration were identified 
through consultations and the literature review. Such initiatives can result in improved 
intelligence and therefore more disruptions to organised criminal networks, and prosecutions 
of serious offenders. In terms of operational collaboration, the strategic use of taskforces 
was supported by many stakeholders. There are several models that could be adopted, 
including an operation-specific multi-agency taskforce or the establishment of a special unit 
within fisheries organisations. With joint operations, there might be the need to address 
factors that fisheries officers viewed as potential impediments to success – differing priorities 
(by 83% of fisheries officers), limited and varied resource allocation (by 75% of fisheries 
officers) and legislative differences, including powers of officers (by 63% of officers).
Introduction
Terms of reference
Anecdotal evidence and some research (see Tailby & Grant 2002; Palmer 2004) suggest that 
the following changes occurred during the past decade in the Australian fishing sector:
growth in organised crime group activity in the systematic harvesting, processing and 
distribution of abalone and rock lobster
organised crime groups using the fishing sector to launder money, and drugs being 
manufactured at aquaculture facilities.
In 2004 the Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) 
contracted the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) to undertake a two-stage project to 
determine the extent and nature of criminal activity in the Australian fishing industry. The 
terms of reference, which were endorsed by the Natural Resource Management Council, 
were to:
determine, by consultation with fisheries and law enforcement agencies, the existence 
and/or extent of organised criminal involvement in the seafood industry
estimate the extent to which this organised activity puts at risk existing or proposed 
fisheries management arrangements, or other laws of the states, territories and 
Commonwealth
advise on whether existing fisheries legislation and the regime of penalties in each 
jurisdiction provide an effective deterrent to crime and whether this effect is measurable 
and adequate
identify and analyse existing legislative approaches for national consistency
advise on the extent to which the organisation of fisheries compliance, and conduct  
of fisheries enforcement effort is adequately attuned to emerging issues in organised 
crime activity
determine if enhancement of traditional policing methods and powers would assist  
in dealing with fisheries crime
examine the extent to which future cooperation between fisheries and police agencies 
should be developed.
The project was undertaken in conjunction with the Australian Crime Commission, which 
had the principal task of assessing organised criminal involvement in the Australian fishing 
industry based on its intelligence holdings.
The scope of the study was confined to fishing in the Australian domestic sector, in the AFZ 
and inland waters, and did not include illegal foreign fishing.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Key concepts
At the outset, it is important to define some of the key terms and concepts relevant  
to the topic.
‘Organised crime’ is defined in the same way as in the United Nations Convention  
against Transnational Organised Crime, Article 2 of which states:
‘Organised criminal group’ shall mean a structured group of three or more persons, 
existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one  
or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention,  
in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit
‘Serious crime’ shall mean conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum 
deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty
‘Structured group’ shall mean a group that is not randomly formed for the immediate 
commission of an offence and that does not need to have formally defined roles for its 
members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure.
Specific activities that relate to organised crime in the industry include:
transfer pricing which entails ‘the under/or over-invoicing of … trade transactions to 
avoid regulatory control’ (Walter 1985: 15)
money laundering, which the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) defines as ‘the 
processing of criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin’. This process is of critical 
importance, as it enables the criminal to enjoy these profits without jeopardising their 
source (OECD 2003)
‘underground banking’ refers to informal banking systems which run parallel to, but 
independent of, the formal banking sector. It involves the transfer of the value of currency 
without its physical relocation (McCusker 2005).
The concept of the ‘fishing industry’ is based on the explanation provided by the Australian 
Government Fisheries Research & Development Council (FRDC), namely, that it includes  
any industry or activity conducted in or from Australia concerned with taking, culturing, 
processing, preserving, storing, transporting, marketing or selling fish or fish products  
(FRDC 2004a). The FRDC has identified three principal industry sectors. These are:
the commercial sector, which comprises enterprises and individuals associated with wild 
catch or aquaculture resources and the various transformations of those resources into 
products for sale. It is also referred to as the ‘seafood industry’, although nonfood items 
such as pearls are included among its products
the recreational sector, which comprises enterprises and individuals associated with the 
purpose of recreation, sport or sustenance with fisheries resources from which products 
are derived that are not for sale
a)
b)
c)
•
•
•
•
•
the traditional sector, which comprises enterprises and individuals associated with 
fisheries resources from which Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people derive 
products in accordance with their traditions (FRDC 2004a).
To assist fisheries officers with completing the survey, a definition for ‘organised crime in the 
Australian fishing industry’ was included at the beginning of the questionnaire. It was defined 
as being a structured group of three or more persons, who work together with the purpose 
of committing a serious offence.
•
Method
From July 2004 to December 2005 the AIC undertook a major systematic study of crime in 
the fishing industry. The study was designed to elicit new information upon which to build a 
credible evidence base of the extent of organised crime in the industry and strategies for 
combating such activity. The study was comprised of five components:
a review of Australian legislation
a review of relevant Australian and overseas literature
consultations with industry and law enforcement stakeholders
a national survey of fisheries officers
a compilation of prosecution and sentencing data from four jurisdictions.
Literature review
The literature review was scoped broadly to gather information from a wide variety of 
sources. These included online and hard copy newspapers, academic journals and books, 
and official reports. Government websites, both within Australia and overseas, were also 
useful sources of information. Material on fisheries crime, law enforcement powers and 
penalty regimes in other countries, such as South Africa, the Russian Federation (in 
particular the RFE), Canada and New Zealand, was examined to place the Australian 
situation in a global context. These countries were chosen because all have important 
fishing sectors as an integral part of their national economies, all have anecdotal or 
documented evidence of organised crime involvement in their fishing industries, and all  
have attempted to circumvent illegal/organised crime activities in their fishing industries,  
with varying degrees of success.
Consultations
Consultations were conducted Australia-wide in the latter part of 2004 with fisheries and  
law enforcement officers and industry representatives. The consultations took place in  
the capital city of each jurisdiction. In some cases consultations took the form of group 
sessions, while others were one-on-one discussions. As well, a roundtable discussion 
involving relevant Australian Government agencies was convened in late 2004 in Canberra.
Four key themes guided the consultations:
stocks vulnerable to organised crime
legislative strengths and weaknesses
operational strengths and weaknesses
•
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extent of cooperation and liaison with other agencies.
After the main findings from the initial consultations were circulated to jurisdictions in the 
Stage 1 report, feedback and further information were elicited from stakeholders in the first 
half of 2005. Jurisdictional representatives were also asked to provide an update on how 
data of illegal activity were recorded. In 2001, an AIC report Assessment of illegal catches  
of Australian abalone (Tailby & Gant 2001) identified data holdings across jurisdictions  
that might provide some information on the illegal harvesting and sale of abalone. During 
consultations, key personnel in each jurisdiction outlined whether there had been changes  
in data systems and in the tracking of illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing (IUU).
Legislative review
All Commonwealth, state and territory Acts and regulations relevant to criminal offences, 
police powers and penalty regimes relating to fisheries were identified. Some 48 separate 
Acts, regulations, rules and management plans were examined in detail. The primary 
enabling legislation reviewed in each jurisdiction was:
Commonwealth: Fisheries Management Act 1991 Great Barrier Reef Marine Park  
Act 1975
Western Australia: Fish Resources Management Act 1994
Australian Capital Territory: Fisheries Act 2000
Queensland: Fisheries Act 1994
South Australia: Fisheries Act 1982
Northern Territory: Fisheries Act 1998
New South Wales: Fisheries Act 1935; Fisheries Management Act 1994 
Victoria: Fisheries Act 1995
Tasmania: Inland Fisheries Act 1995; Living Marine Resources Management Act 1995.
National survey of fisheries officers
An Australia-wide survey of fisheries officers was conducted between July and September 
2005. This canvassed officers’ views on:
knowledge of illegal/organised crime in the fishing industry in the local area and across 
their jurisdiction
the extent of that crime
•
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the modus operandi of illegal/organised crime fishers
issues facing fisheries officers in dealing with illegal/organised crime
limitations or otherwise of the existing legal framework to deal with illegal/organised crime
limitations or otherwise of inter-jurisdictional cooperation.
The questionnaire was finalised after piloting with a group of former fisheries officers now 
based at DAFF and comments from AIC research staff, the Australian Fisheries Managers 
Forum, state managers and their senior compliance staff. A copy of the questionnaire is 
provided in Appendix C.
The questionnaire was administered using the AIC’s internet site. There were 311 responses 
in total from a population of 567, resulting in a 55 percent response rate. Response rates 
varied across jurisdictions, and the details by jurisdiction are set out in Table 1. To ensure 
that responses reflected the actual distribution of fisheries officers, the data have been 
appropriately weighted. Unless otherwise specified, results from the survey are based on  
the weighted data.
Table 1: Survey response details
Jurisdiction Total population Number who replied Response rate (%)
Queensland 144 88 61
Western Australia 105 79 75
Victoria 104 37 36
New South Wales 83 39 47
South Australia 48 31 65
Tasmania 35 24 69
AFMA 33 9 27
Northern Territory 13 2 15
ACT 2 2 100
Total 567 311 55
Source: AIC National Fisheries Survey 2005 [computer file]
Fisheries officers who responded to the survey had the following characteristics:
the overwhelming majority were male
the average age was 39 years
the majority had completed a Year 12 certificate at school
over half (60%) were currently employed in monitoring, surveillance and enforcement 
work. A further 16 percent were employed in compliance, supervision and monitoring.
•
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To ascertain trends in fishing crimes, prosecutions and sentencing outcomes, four 
jurisdictions were asked to provide data for a five-year period, between the 1999 and 2004 
calendar years. The jurisdictions included in the data collection were Queensland, Northern 
Territory, Victoria and the Commonwealth (AFMA). The type of data requested included:
unique offender identity numbers (if available)
the offence date
the court appearance date
details of the offence
the offence location
court outcome.
The extent and detail of the data varied between jurisdictions. No two jurisdictions data  
were similar in layout or content. There was no uniformity between jurisdictions as to how 
the offence information is set out, or the recording of details of a specific offence. Missing  
or incomplete data were common, particularly the details of the offence and the location  
of the offence. It was impossible to compare data because of these differences in recording.
•
•
•
•
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Australian fisheries 
The threats posed to fishing industries have increased as result of flourishing demand 
globally and by changing/improved fishing techniques (Clarke 2002; Deglar 2004; Ekron 
2004; Fish Information and Services 2004; Marshall 2002; Njobeni 2004; Outdoor News 
Network 2004; The Times Standard 2004; and Weaver 2004). Various overseas reports 
discuss the threats posed by illegal recreational activity and organised criminal networks 
(Curtis et al. 2003; Gastrow 2001; Dean 2004; Vancouver Aquarium Aquatic Environmental 
News Network 2004). Linked to the increasing demand globally for fish products is the 
escalating threat of IUU fishing (also known as ‘fish piracy’ – see Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD 2004a). IUU activity is focused increasingly on deep 
sea fisheries because of the depletion of coastal fisheries. This has ramifications for deep 
sea species and ecosystems. Arguably, Australia’s fishing industry could become 
increasingly under threat from IUU fishing, by criminally-minded domestic or foreign 
operators. Australia is a member of the Ministerial Task Force on IUU fishing, with other 
members including Chile, Namibia, New Zealand and Britain (see Doulman 2000; Oceana 
2003; OECD 2003).
Fish and other seafood, and their habitat, have considerable economic and environmental 
value. Australia’s fishing zone measures 11 million square kilometres, and extends 200 
nautical miles from the coastline. Despite its size, the poor nutrient content of Australia’s 
waters means that they are not highly productive by world standards. However, it is an 
important primary industry which results in direct and indirect employment for a large 
number of Australians, and results in considerable export earnings for the country, as the 
production and export statistics highlight in Tables 2 and 3. To summarise:
In 2002–03, Australia’s commercial fishing sector harvested approximately 249,000 
tonnes of seafood, with a landed value of approximately A$2.3 billion (FRDC 2004b).
Between 1991–92 and 2001–02, the value of Australia’s aquaculture sector grew from 
A$202 million to A$733 million. A wide range of seafood products are now farmed, for 
example, ‘pearls, prawns, redclaw, barramundi, crocodiles, Atlantic salmon, edible 
oysters; abalone, mussels, trout, silver perch, murray cod, yabbies and marron’ (Love  
& Langenkamp 2003: 3).
Australia’s seafood industry represents the country’s fourth most important food-based 
primary industry (after beef, wheat and milk) (Seafood Training Australia 2005).
There are approximately 80,000 people employed in the seafood industry. This figure 
does not include indirect employment, such as compliance, transport, storage, 
wholesale and retail sectors (Seafood Training Australia 2005).
In 2002–03 the export value of Australian seafood product was A$1.85 billion (in the 
main, rock lobster, pearls, tuna, prawns, and abalone) (Australia. Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade 2004).
•
•
•
•
•
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Table 2: Value of seafood exports 2002–03 ($m)
Product Value 
Rock lobster 493
Pearls 404
Tuna 319
Prawns 263
Abalone 263
Other crustaceans 263
Scallops 34
Oysters 4
Source: Seafood Training Australia 2005 
The economic benefits of the fishing industry are distributed across the country as Table 3 
shows. In addition to the export revenue generated by high value species such as rock 
lobster, tuna and abalone there is a large domestic market for seafood. It is estimated that 
90 percent of Australians eat seafood and that each person consumes approximately 16 
kilograms of fish and seafood annually (AFMA 2005a; Seafood Training Australia 2005). By 
2050 it is estimated Australia’s population of 25 million people will require 1,150,000 tonnes 
of seafood, with an average consumption of 23 kilograms per person per annum (Kearney 
et al. 2003).
Table 3: Value of Australia’s fisheries (wild catch and aquaculture)  
2002–03 ($’000)
State/territory Gross value of production 
Western Australia 607,148
AFMA (2001–02) 417,029
South Australia 473,514
Tasmania 288,225
Queensland 285,313
New South Wales 135,191
Victoria 108,877
Northern Territory 54,919
Source: AFMA 2003; Seafood Training Australia 2005
With the increasing demand for Australian seafood in overseas markets and an expanding 
domestic market, the fishing industry will be under ever increasing pressure to harvest 
resources in a sustainable manner. Given concerns globally about depletions in the world’s 
fisheries, authorities and legitimate fishers alike share an interest in maintaining the 
sustainability of Australia fish stocks and the viability of the fishing industry.
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Fisheries management regimes in Australia
A report prepared for the OECD on Australian fisheries outlines current management 
regimes, some of the complexities surrounding jurisdictional responsibilities and problems 
arising from an excess fishing capacity (OECD 2004b). Except where agreement is reached 
to the contrary, the Australian Government’s jurisdiction extends from the three to the 200 
nautical mile limit of the AFZ, while state jurisdiction is from the coastline to the three nautical 
mile limit. Under more than 50 Offshore Constitutional Settlement fisheries arrangements, 
the management of a specified fish stock or a commercial fishery has been transferred to  
a single jurisdiction or is managed in partnership under a joint authority arrangement. In 
general terms, the Australian Government aims to retain overall management responsibility 
for all highly migratory fish stocks and any fish species subject to regional or international 
agreements, while the states have responsibility for day to day management of recreational, 
including charter, fishing and traditional fishing (OECD 2004b: 10).
At the federal level, responsibility for domestic Commonwealth fisheries management rests 
with the statutory authority, the Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA). Under 
the Fisheries Management Act 1991, AFMA can allocate four types of fishing concessions – 
statutory fishing rights, fishing permits, scientific permits, and foreign fishing permits. The 
management of most commercial fisheries in state waters is under the control of state 
governments through the relevant fisheries departments, which are responsible for 
monitoring and enforcing compliance with state based legislation that defines fisheries-
related offences.
In essence, fisheries management seeks to balance sectoral interests – commercial, 
recreational and Indigenous – as well as to manage fish resources so that their use and 
development are ecologically sustainable. Commercial fisheries management techniques 
include input controls – time based (such as seasonal closures), entry based (such as 
licensing), and gear based (such as net and boat size limits). Output controls include total 
allowable catch (TAC) and individual transferable quotas. In most fisheries a combination  
of controls are applied involving limited entry, time and area based controls and either gear 
and/or boat based mechanisms.
To ensure that management arrangements are working, risk based compliance regimes  
are deployed as appropriate – depending on the fishery – by the Australian and state 
governments and involve a mixture of physical surveillance both on water and from the air, 
the monitoring of unloads of catches in port, the auditing of paper trails to determine catch 
landings and technical applications such as vessel monitoring systems (VMS; OECD 2004b).
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Key commercial fish species and fisheries
Key fish species in Australian coastal areas that are vulnerable to illegal exploitation and 
trade are high value and low volume species such as abalone and rock lobster. The following 
figures for abalone highlight the volume and value of the legitimate market for these key 
fisheries:
Southeast Australia is home to some of the last highly productive wild abalone stocks  
in the world, with Tasmania producing around 25 percent of global wild abalone and 
Victoria producing 10 percent of the global wild harvest. There are 71 abalone fishery 
access licence holders in Victoria who take approximately 1,360 tonnes a year. With  
an annual landed catch value of approximately $50 million, abalone is the most valuable 
commercial fishery in Victoria. Ninety-five percent of all abalone harvested in Victoria  
is exported (Arnold 2005).
In 2002, Tasmania’s commercial abalone take was worth $115 million with 50 percent  
of abalone exported live to Japan or Hong Kong and the bulk of the remainder being 
canned (TDPIWE 2004a). 
In South Australia, approximately five percent of the world’s wild abalone is harvested. 
There are in excess of 500 South Australians employed in fishing, processing, regulating 
and supporting the abalone industry. South Australia’s 35 licence holders sell around  
$50 million worth of abalone per year. 
In Western Australia, abalone is worth an estimated $15 million per year (Western 
Australia. Department of Fisheries 2004).
The organisation of, and regulatory environment within, each fish industry differs depending 
on the type of species and jurisdiction. Abalone is unique in that it is the only species to be 
tier 2 species under the National Docketing System, a complementary approach across the 
country to monitor its extraction, processing and sale, although not all jurisdictions have 
implemented the system to date. There is a five-state organisation, the Australian Abalone 
Council, which has been created with representatives from Western Australia, South 
Australia, Victoria, New South Wales and Tasmania. In Tasmania, for example, there is also  
a state-wide 12-member Management Advisory Committee comprising representatives of 
divers, processors, recreational fishery and quota holders, which considers the rate of catch, 
the health of the industry and legislative recommendations. Jurisdictional variations in the 
abalone industry are indicated by the following accounts of licensing/quota arrangements 
and reporting requirements:
The Western Australian Abalone Industry Association comprises all the licence  
holders and is completely self-funded. It is a small industry, with 31 licences. Under  
the regulations, operators are required to prior report, and are then required to count  
and weigh on the beach, and fill out the appropriate documentation within 30 minutes  
of landing (Western Australian stakeholder comments 2004).
•
•
•
•
•
15
As yet there are no prior reporting requirements for the commercial abalone industry  
in Victoria. Divers seal and tag the abalone on landing, weigh at the beach and report  
the weight, location, number of bins, time of landing, and time of weighing to the 
Department of Primary Industries (VDPI 2004a). 
In Tasmania, there are 3,500 quota units for 717 kilograms of abalone entitlement per 
annum. The value of the quota units is approximately $250,000 to $300,000 per unit. 
When the abalone fishery went to quota, 125 dive licences were issued (reduced to 123 
licences after two were forfeited following prosecutions for illegal fishing activity). There 
are 26 abalone processors in Tasmania. There has been an increase in the number of 
Asian groups running factories in Tasmania, as well as setting up dive operations. At 
present they are operating eight out of a total of 26 factories (Tasmanian stakeholder 
comment 2004).
In New South Wales, there are approximately 42 shareholders and divers in the abalone 
industry which is worth approximately $15 million annually to the state (New South Wales 
Fisheries 2003). The person who owns the shares or quota is the shareholder. There is a 
public register and it is primarily a family based industry (New South Wales stakeholder 
comment 2004).
In South Australia, the TAC is set at 880 tonnes (South Australia. Department of Primary 
Industry and Resources 2004) and stakeholders indicated there are 35 abalone licences.
With rock lobster, which was worth nearly $500 million in 2002–03 in export earnings, the 
Western Australia industry is the largest in Australia and worth about $300 million, with 
around 580 commercial operators. A record catch of 14,500 tonnes was recorded in the 
1999–2000 season (Western Australia. Department of Fisheries 2000b). In Victoria, the 
southern rock lobster (crayfish) fishery is worth $20 million in exports annually (VDPI 2004b), 
in New South Wales the industry is worth $4.6 million annually (New South Wales Fisheries 
2003b), and the Tasmanian industry accounts for about eight percent of Australia’s 
production. Much of the rock lobster is shipped from Sydney or Melbourne to Hong Kong 
where it may be transhipped to other destinations, such as Singapore, China and Taiwan 
(TDPIWE 2004b).
Rock lobster is another major commercial fishery. In Western Australia rock lobster will be 
going to quota with lobster pots costing around $25,000. A 100 pot licence, together with  
a boat and associated gear is valued at approximately $4 million (Western Australia. 
Department of Fisheries 2000b). The rock lobster fishery operates under a quota system 
with real-time reporting requirements. Prior reporting enables fisheries officers to be at the 
landing stage by the time the boat docks. In Tasmania, there are 314 rock lobster licences, 
with about 240 boats and generally two people on each boat (TDPIWE 2004b). 
According to a 2001 report, the Australian shark catch is dominated by shark catch in the 
target shark fisheries and, to a lesser extent, by shark retained as byproduct (Rose & Shark 
•
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Advisory Group 2001). The species and quantities of shark discarded by commercial fishers, 
including those that may have been illegally finned, appear to have been poorly quantified. 
There are a range of target shark fisheries including the Southern Shark Fishery (which now 
makes up the gillnet sector and shark hook sector within the larger South and Eastern 
Scalefish and Shark Fishery (SESSF)), the Western Australian shark fisheries and the 
Northern Territory shark fishery. Individual transferable quotas were introduced for school 
and gummy shark in the gillnet and shark hook sectors from 2001 and for sawfish and 
elephant fish from 2002. Under an Offshore Constitutional Settlement fisheries arrangement, 
AFMA is now responsible for managing school and gummy shark in the coastal waters of 
South Australia, Tasmania, and Victoria (Caton & McLoughlin 2004). With the northern shark 
fisheries, new management arrangements were implemented by the Northern Territory 
Department of Business, Economic and Regional Development (NTDBERD) in 2004–05  
to ensure the ongoing sustainability of the fishery (NTDBERD 2005).
Most of the Northern Territory and Queensland shark fisheries involved four to six main 
operators in each jurisdiction in 1999, although there were also a large number of fishers 
taking shark while targeting other species. By 2001 the number of shark fishery licences  
had dropped (Rose & Shark Advisory Group 2001). Northern Territory stakeholders in 2004 
indicated there were 17–18 licences in the industry, with the fishery operating up to 30 miles 
offshore. In addition, Karumba shark fishers (Queensland) work across the border into the 
Northern Territory. The main produce from sharks landed in Australia is meat, most of which 
is used for domestic consumption. Several sources of data from the 1990s indicated that 
Queensland is the major exporter of shark, with the United States and Korea as the main 
overseas markets (Rose & Shark Advisory Group 2001).
Other commercial fisheries include the pearling industry and the Southern bluefin tuna 
industry; these however were less likely to be seen by stakeholders as vulnerable to low-
level fishing-related illegal activity from outsiders because of tight security:
Southern bluefin tuna is a major aquaculture industry in South Australia, earning about 
$400 million per annum. The industry works off global and national quotas but the TAC 
does not include recreational catch, which has not been accurately quantified. Not many 
thefts are reported from the fishery, which has private security guards guarding the pens 
(stakeholder comment 2004).
The pearling industry in Western Australia has 16 licences. It is comprised of joint 
ventures or company structures and three major groups market the product. It is a 
vertically integrated industry worth approximately $200 million annually. The remoteness 
of the pearl farms makes them accessible only by boat or by plane. The farms use radio 
sensor fences, satellite surveillance arrangement and people who live on the farm at all 
times (industry stakeholder comments 2004, Western Australia. Department of Fisheries 
1997a; 1997b; 2000). 
•
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When consulted in 2004, stakeholders perceived commercial fisheries vulnerable to illegal 
exploitation or the industry vulnerable to criminal activity to include:
Timor box fishery – operates around the Evans Shoal area of the Timor Reef, from the 
West Australia/Northern Territory border out as far as the outer limits of the AFZ. There 
are two types of fishing activity – the line and the drop fishery – both of which target reef 
fish, for example, red emperor, golden snapper, red snapper and cods, which are 
transported to the Sydney Fish Market.
Trawler fishery – in Queensland in 2004 there were 480 trawlers, 90 percent of which are 
owner-operated. The trawl industry harvests scallops, prawns, squid, Moreton Bay bugs 
and stout whiting. Bycatch includes blue swimmer crabs, Balmain bugs, cuttlefish and 
octopus. Large companies own the majority of the trawls.
Coral reef fishery (live fish trade) – in Queensland the fish targeted in this fishery include 
grouper, coral trout snapper, wrasses, emperors (for example Red Throat Emperor), 
sweetlips and seabream. Live fish are transhipped in fish tanks and flown out from 
Cairns.
Marine scale fishery – in South Australia this fishery is worth $12 million per annum. It 
includes species such as KGW, calamari, garfish, western sand whiting and snapper.
Prawn fishery – operates across the Gulf and the top end of Australian waters, with 
mother ships operating out of Cairns and Darwin. Other prawn fisheries in various 
jurisdictions were not mentioned during stakeholder consultations as potentially 
vulnerable.
Mud crabs – in the Northern Territory in 2004 there were 49 licences worth about 
$400,000 each. The fishery is open all year and both males and females can be 
harvested. In Queensland, the taking of female crabs is prohibited.
Barramundi – in the Northern Territory in 2004, there were 25 barramundi licences, 
operated by long-time Territorians. As a cash fishery it is small scale, and in 2002 the 
commercial barramundi harvest totalled 740 tonnes (Northern Territory. Fisheries Group 
2003). The barramundi fishery (like the mackerel industry) operates around the coast.
Murray cod – South Australia has a legitimate commercial Murray cod and callop  
(a South Australia specific word for golden perch) fishery, while in Victoria, there is  
a ban on commercial fishing of native fish.
Bêche-de-mer (sea cucumber, trepang) – in the Northern Territory one company owns  
all six licences according to stakeholders; it is processed in Tasmania. In Queensland in 
2004 there were three licence holders for bêche-de-mer and trochus.
Eels – Victoria has a small aquaculture eel fishery in lakes with 14 licence holders; the 
main export market for eels is Europe.
•
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Recreational fishers
From the stakeholder consultations, it was apparent that there were regulatory differences 
across jurisdictions in recreational fishing related to licensing and permit arrangements, and 
the quantity, size and sex of specified fish stocks. With rock lobster, for example, in Western 
Australia, the recreational take is 400 tonnes a year. Two pots are allowed per fisher, and 
recreational fishers are allowed to dive for rock lobster. There is no possession limit on rock 
lobster, only abalone, with recreational takers required to tail clip the lobsters. The season 
runs from 15 November to 30 June. In South Australia, recreational fishers can take four 
rock lobsters per day in the season, and they only need a permit for a pot. There is a 
maximum of two pots (it costs $35 for the first pot and $75 for the second pot). There  
were 12,000 permits issued in 2004, whereas in 2003 the total number of permits was 
10,000. There are 20,000 recreational pots and the sector leases back 5,000 extra from  
the commercial sector. It is a requirement for the recreational sector that harvested rock 
lobster must be clipped.
Stakeholder consultations highlighted changes that have occurred, or are advocated,  
to reduce recreational fishing of a range a species including abalone, barramundi, and 
various marine scale species. In discussions on this topic the total size and impact of the 
recreational take was clearly a concern, along with the opportunities within this sector  
for more systematic illegal exploitation of the resource. For example:
It has been estimated that there are approximately 550,000 recreational abalone fishers 
in Victoria, not all of whom are legitimate harvesters (VDPI 2004a). In 2004–05 new 
recreational controls were introduced including a reduction in catch limits and a closed 
season for central Victorian waters (VDPI 2005).
There are seasonal closures in the Northern Territory for recreational fishing  
of barramundi. It is estimated that the recreational barramundi harvest in 2000  
amounted to 370 tonnes, but that 76 percent of the catch was released (Northern 
Territory. Fisheries Group 2004). Concern was expressed about the large quantities  
of barramundi being taken by recreational fishers from other states, who were 
transporting it home in freezer loads.
In South Australia snapper has a closed season while KGW does not. Some 
stakeholders advocate the introduction of recreational licences for KGW, as they  
claim the recreational sector is taking up to 60 percent of the KGW TAC, with the 
commercial net fisher estimated to be taking around 10 percent.
The increase in the green zones from five percent to more than 33 percent in the  
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park means that neither recreational nor commercial fishers 
can fish in these waters. Displacement of legitimate activity to areas outside of the green 
zones and the creation of a black market in fish from these zones were raised as issues 
by stakeholders.
•
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The market for illegal product
From the literature it is apparent that East Asia is an influential driver of the seafood trade in 
products such as abalone and shark fin. Fish has always been an important component of 
the East Asian diet and this is coupled with the centuries-old use of fisheries products as 
health tonics or medicines. The growing affluence of some East Asian societies (for example, 
China, Malaysia and Thailand) has had a dramatic impact on the demand for both dietary 
and medicinal fish products. It is believed that China, in particular, exerts considerable 
demand on the market (Clarke 2002).
Hong Kong is the focus for the legal global trade in products such as abalone, shark fin, 
seahorses, and bêche-de-mer. There appears to be a major market for illegal abalone, with 
dried abalone being sold in large quantities in Hong Kong. Hong Kong acts as a gateway  
for the legitimate and illegal trade to mainland China, and it has been suggested that two 
systems operate to facilitate the smuggling of abalone into mainland China, with the first 
involving local fishing authorities where a duty is paid. This is a safer but more expensive 
option than the second system via ‘gangster controlled organisations’ (Chung 2005).
The profits from the market in illegal products are likely to be great. For example, a serving  
of small black cultured abalone from either Taiwan or China will cost approximately US$12  
in a Hong Kong restaurant. Tinned abalone from Japan, South Africa, Australia, Mexico and 
the Philippines containing two abalone will cost approximately US$70. The ‘best’ abalone 
(Gon Bao Yu) costs up to US$1,250. In ‘post-revolutionary China, the nouveau riche are 
willing to pay up to US$5,000 for a meal which includes Gon Bao Yu’ (Clarke 2002: 17).
It has been estimated that the legal shark fin trade is increasing by five percent annually,  
with an ever-growing mainland China market, resulting in intensified competition among 
restaurants specialising in shark fin. In the years 1998–2002, 11 metric tonnes per year of 
shark fin were imported into Hong Kong (Lee 2004). It is believed that Hong Kong is the 
centre for 50–80 percent of the world trade in shark fin (Shark Finning IUCN Information 
Paper, cited in Lee 2004). Like the abalone trade, mainland China’s growing middle class 
has created an increasing demand for shark fin for use in soup. While Hong Kong is the 
central distribution point for the shark fin industry, mainland China is the major destination  
for drying and processing (Clarke 2002). According to a WildAid observer, apart from  
China, processing plants exist on a small scale in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore,  
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand as well as other producer countries where Chinese 
traders have settled, such as Ecuador, Brazil and South Africa (Victor Wu, personal 
communication 2005).
There is very little literature that specifically focuses on the Hong Kong trade in seahorses. 
Most international sources discuss protection of the species or the availability of product  
to supply aquariums (see Courtney 2003; International Fund for Animal Welfare 2004;  
0
Lee 2004; Marine Work Group Ireland 2003; Moore 1997; Project Seahorse 2004; Saleh 
2004; TRAFFIC 2002, 2004). The traditional Chinese medicine trade includes marine life 
such as seahorses. In 2002, a CITES guide was released to assist law enforcers globally in 
identifying illegal product (Allan 2005: 53). In spite of a trade ban from China to Taiwan, there 
is a flourishing trade in seahorses, given that China is the largest market for this commodity. 
The trade is facilitated through individual fishing boats, as well as local businessmen 
conducting trade through Hong Kong. It has been reported that
Volumes of dried seahorses recorded as exported from Australia in the period 1998–
2002 were less than 15 kg while imports to China, Hong Kong and Taiwan over the 
same period were over 700 kg … the large discrepancies between export and import 
data sets for pipehorses (up to five-fold) suggest that Australian exports may have 
been significantly under-reported (Martin-Smith & Vincent 2005: 12).
Another fish commodity where there seems to be a lucrative black market is bêche-de-mer 
which is sourced from the southwest Pacific Islands states, as well as countries such as 
Australia, Kenya, Mexico, Indonesia, Ecuador and the Philippines. Again, Hong Kong is the 
major importer of this product (approximately 80%), with Singapore ranked second. It has 
been suggested that Singapore imports higher grade product, while Hong Kong imports 
lower grade bêche-de-mer, primarily for the Chinese market (Conand & Byrne 1993). 
However according to a recent survey, Hong Kong traders believe the highest quality bêche-
de-mer originates from Japan, the Pacific coast of South America, South Africa and 
Australia (Clarke 2002: 63).
It is clear that overseas illicit markets in seafood products such as abalone, bêche-de-mer 
and shark fin are flourishing, due in large part to a steadily increasing demand from mainland 
China. What is also clear is that there is extensive international involvement in terms of 
supply (e.g. Australia or South Africa), harvesting (e.g. Spain, Indonesia or domestic 
operator), facilitation (e.g. COC or other organised crime group) and the market (for 
example, mainland China). It is also clear from the literature that the illicit trade is well run, 
with established markets and distribution routes.
While there are three priority species in Australia that were identified from the literature as 
attractive to international illegal markets (abalone, shark fin and seahorses) there are also 
illegal domestic markets in many species, including abalone, rock lobster and native fish. 
During the 2004 consultations, stakeholders also referred to illegal restaurant/café trade in 
poached reef fish, eel, yabbies, squid, razor fish, snapper and dhufish, as well as the illegal 
taking of rare cowries, ornamental fish and coral. It is impossible to estimate the size and 
value of these illegal domestic markets. At the top end of the scale it was estimated in 1997 
that one of Australia’s better known abalone poachers was earning in excess of $1 million  
a year from the harvest and sale of illegal abalone (cited in Tailby & Gant 2002). Tailby and 
Gant thoroughly researched the illegal market in Australian abalone but were not able to 
quantify accurately either the size or the value of the illegal market. 
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Although there are estimates of theft or poaching of various types of fish, there are no public 
estimates of how much of the stolen or illegally obtained fish is consumed in the domestic 
black market. Examples of estimates of illegal take of abalone include that 13 percent of the 
abalone TAC in Victoria constitutes ‘unaccounted catch’ which includes both illegal fishing 
and the legitimate recreational harvest (VDPI 2004c). Another estimate is that, of the annual 
harvest in excess of 1,440 tonnes, approximately 400 tonnes is poached illegally (Arnold 
2005). In NSW it has been estimated that abalone theft amounts between 20 and 60 
percent of the TAC (Palmer 2004).
Illegal activity in Australia
Efforts to protect Australia’s fisheries from overexploitation include preventing the illegal 
harvest and trade in fish products. Although there has always been some illegal activity  
in Australia’s domestic fishing industry, much of it could be characterised as small scale  
and akin to low level noncompliance with fishing regulations. Among the different sectors – 
commercial, recreational and Indigenous subsistence fishing (in some instances protected 
by customary marine tenure) – there are opportunities to engage in illegal activity. Much of 
this may occur on an infrequent and opportunistic basis.
Illegal activities can take a variety of forms. Commercial fishers (Anderson & McCusker  
2005) may:
avoid reporting or under-report their catch
co-mingle illegal with legal catches
operate a vertically integrated fishing business to facilitate money laundering activities 
sell commercial catch to clubs, restaurants, hotels or private individuals on a cash or 
barter basis
take in excess of the allowable quota
swap their catch between their commercial and recreational allowances (for example 
distributing catch between their various crab and lobster pots).
Some of these activities, such as selling of catch to restaurants, may also be practised by 
recreational fishers and can contribute to the overexploitation of vulnerable species. The 
recreational fishing sector is widely popular, with over a quarter of Australia’s population 
estimated to engage in the pastime (FRDC 2004b). According to many stakeholders, 
although the large majority of recreational fishers are believed to be compliant, there appears 
to some low level organised illegal activity, particularly among ethnically and culturally based 
family groups. This activity is a means of providing extra household cash through selling fish 
to domestic businesses, such as fish and chip shops, restaurants, cafes, hotels, clubs, or 
through bartering the fish for services in kind.
•
•
•
•
•
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Organised criminal activity
In contrast to the occasional and lower level noncompliance with fisheries regulations that 
occurs within the recreational, commercial and subsistence fishers there is a smaller but 
significant group of habitual or repeat offenders who have been characterised as:
criminals who systematically flout fisheries regulations to profit from the illegal sale  
of high value fish such as abalone
fish thieves who regularly flout the regulations for a range of personal benefits, including 
illegal sale, bartering or personal use
subsistence fishers who regularly flout the regulations in order to provide themselves  
and their families with traditional seafood items that are not readily obtainable through 
normal retail seafood outlets (Victoria. Parliament. Environment and Natural Resources 
Committee 2002: 243).
During stakeholder consultations three key risk factors which might facilitate the infiltration  
of organised crime into the industry were identified:
the structural nature of the industry
the profitability of the sector
the entrepreneurship of organised crime groups.
Structurally the sector comprises many small business ventures, subject to seasonal fishing 
fluctuations and competition from seafood imports that create financial pressures. The 
sector is also characterised by seasonal work which can attract individuals with involvement 
in other criminal activity such as poaching and the distribution of drugs. These structural 
factors can reduce the resiliency of the sector to organised criminal activity.
As resources become scarcer and therefore more valuable, it is to be expected that there 
will be commensurate growth in poaching and illicit markets. Systematic criminal activity, 
which is more likely to target the vulnerable and most valuable species, not only escalates 
the level of illegal activity but also its impact. It has been argued that one impact is an 
increase in criminal activity generally in the Australia domestic fishing sector, such as 
environmental offences, theft, fraud, quarantine violation, tax evasion and serious crime 
against people, including murder (MacKinnon 2003: 2). The increasing profitability of the 
sector (as resources are depleted) makes the sector more attractive to organised criminal 
groups.
The potential consequences of more organised criminal activity, particularly if it involves 
established criminal networks with overseas connections, include:
damage to the habitat of fish through improper fishing practices
rapid and severe depletion of key fish stocks
•
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seafood hazardous to health due to poor handling and illegal processing
pressure on legitimate markets and producers, due to unfair competition
threats to fisheries officers and legitimate operators.
Some of these consequences are evident in overseas countries. Illegal exploitation of 
specific species in the RFE, Canada, South Africa and New Zealand has brought some 
industries to a standstill. For example, South Africa and Canada’s abalone industries have 
been much reduced. In the RFE, the King crab and Alaskan pollock sectors suffer from high 
levels of poaching. While New Zealand’s paua (abalone) fishery has been heavily targeted  
by organised crime groups and several coastal fishing areas have been closed, it remains  
a viable industry. For example, the annual legal catch is 1,057 tonnes and it is estimated  
that an additional 1,000 tonnes is poached (Heatley 2004).
The entrepreneurship of criminal groups is evidenced by overseas experience. This 
demonstrates how organised crime can be involved in domestic fishing sectors, and can 
use both fish and fishing vessels to facilitate trade in illicit goods and illegally sourced 
resources. The increasing demand globally of high value, low volume seafood products  
(for example, shark fin, bêche-de-mer, seahorses, the restaurant live fish trade, aquarium 
fish, abalone, rock lobster, native fish) means that they may be traded for and with other 
illegal commodities, for example, drugs, arms, and people (human trafficking/sexual slavery). 
However, the level of organised criminal involvement in the fishing sectors varies within and 
between countries, with much of this evidence pointing to fishing vessels being used to 
facilitate other criminal activity. Known examples include:
COC groups linked to the fishing industries of South Africa, Australia and New Zealand
active links between FSU and COC organised crime include other commodities, apart 
from fish, for example, timber, ferrous and nonferrous metals and gold in the RFE
FSU groups are reputedly involved in arms smuggling, fraud, car theft and drug 
trafficking and COC groups are linked to abalone and shark smuggling, illegal rhino  
horn and ivory trading, drug importation and distribution, money laundering, tax evasion, 
human trafficking and trade in contraband goods in South Africa (Gastrow 1999; United 
States. Drug Enforcement Administration 2002; Watts 2003)
active OMCG involvement in a variety of crimes, including the use of fishing vessels  
to transport drugs, and the possible infiltration by FSU crime groups of Canada’s west 
coast fishing industry (Royal Canadian Mounted Police 2001).
As organised crime increases its involvement in this sector, there is evidence emerging that 
many of the groups such as COC, FSU crime groups, Yakuza (Japanese organised crime 
groups) and OMCG are developing cooperative arrangements to facilitate the supply and 
distribution of a range of illegally obtained or illicit commodities. In the RFE, FSU crime 
groups, the Yakuza and COC allegedly cooperate over commodities such as fish and timber 
•
•
•
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(Curtis et al. 2003), with FSU crime groups and COC also cooperating in the supply of drugs 
and alcohol, human trafficking, illegal immigration and gambling.
Systematic criminal involvement in the international traffic of illegally sourced fish products  
is facilitated by networking between different crime groups, as and when the need arises.  
A wide range of criminal activities may be associated with the illegal trade, including the 
concealment of financial transactions and profits. These crimes include violence, corruption, 
fraud, and money laundering, with the transfer of the proceeds of crime across networks 
and national borders through such methods as transfer pricing and underground banking 
(McCusker 2005; Willetts 1998).
Capacity to deal with organised criminal activities
There is a considerable body of literature on debates relating to fisheries conservation and 
management regimes, for example quota systems and marine parks (Bellwood et al. 2004; 
Carter 2003; Day 2002; Foster & Haward 2003; Hannesson 1998; Harvey, Clarke & von 
Baumgarten 2002; Hilborn, Punt & Orensanz 2004; Hønneland 2000; Jentoft 2000; 
Kearney, Andrew & West 1996; Manson & Die 2001; McCay 1995; Phillips, Kriwoken & Hay 
2002; and Wescott 2000) some of which relate to specific types of fishing industries. There 
is also a body of legal scholarship dealing with international agreements to protect fish 
stocks (for example: Barkin & DeSombre 2000; Barston 1999; Cole 2003; Johnston & 
VanderZwaag 2000; Mann Borgese 2000; Stokke 2000).
Although it is important to have international and national regulatory regimes that seek to 
protect the environment and ensure industry sustainability, they are not primarily aimed at 
tackling serious fisheries crime or organised criminal activity linked to the fishing industry. 
Addressing organised criminal activity in fishing creates law enforcement challenges for all 
the countries examined (South Africa, Russian Federation, Canada, and New Zealand). The 
most extreme example, the involvement of FSU crime groups in the RFE’s fishing industry, 
highlights the ability of organised crime groups to infiltrate vulnerable or weakened law 
enforcement organisations. The sustainability of the RFE fishing industry is threatened by a 
failure to address organised criminal activity in the industry because of official corruption and 
bureaucratic infighting, lack of resources (including the termination of government subsidies), 
and regulatory inadequacies. As well, the importation of poached seafood (in this case 
predominantly to Japan) demonstrates that where there is the demand there can be a 
thriving black market in fish, even in highly regulated environments.
Overseas experience suggests there are key factors that can hinder efforts to reduce and 
prevent organised criminal activity, including:
a weak or complex regulatory environment
inadequate resources and expertise
•
•
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corruption and poor governance
insufficient cooperation between key agencies nationally and internationally.
Conclusion
It was not possible within the scope of this research to compare the perceived levels of 
criminal activity in the fishing industry with other industries’ or sectors’ experiences of crime. 
The AIC has undertaken research that has investigated farm crime and crimes against small 
business, but these focused on their experiences of victimisation, where for example, a theft 
or vandalism is perpetrated against the business. The literature on organised criminal activity 
suggests that there is extensive infiltration of natural resource sectors and illegal trade in 
these resources in many parts of the world. Areas of exploitation include illicit trafficking in 
natural resources including petroleum, timber, diamonds and other minerals (Environmental 
Investigation Agency 2004; United Nations 2005) and the trade in wildlife (Cook, Roberts & 
Lowther 2002; Lin 2005; Naylor 2002; Warchol 2004). However, Australia’s economic and 
political circumstances are different from many of these countries, so that it is less vulnerable 
to the most excessive forms of corruption and illegal activity. There are, however, 
characteristics of the fishing industry – the regulatory framework that separates commercial 
from recreational activity, the use of boats, the many small operators involved in fishing and 
processing, the value and portability of some fish commodities, and its geographical spread 
which means that fishing occurs even in the most remote parts of Australia – which lend 
itself to certain kinds of hard to detect criminal activities.
There are several reasons that the fishing industry in Australia may be attractive to organised 
crime groups. The industry comprises small businesses with relatively little cohesion and 
organisation. This may help to facilitate infiltration by crime groups, which may operate 
vertical businesses, collude with the processing and distribution sector and have overseas 
links. It is possible, either now or into the future, that there will be links built between COC/
FSU/OMCG in Australia to facilitate transnational trafficking in illicit goods and resources, 
including fish.
To better understand whether this is a likely scenario and to assess whether Australia can 
deal with such infiltration, three key questions guided the research:
What is the nature and extent of illegal activity in the Australian fishing sector?
What is the current response to illegal activity? 
Could improvements be introduced to reduce the risk of systematic criminal exploitation 
of valuable fish resources?
•
•
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•
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The next chapter presents findings relevant to the first question about the nature and  
extent of criminal activity in Australia’s fishing industry. The following two chapters present 
information that addresses the question about current responses in terms of legislation, law 
enforcement, prosecution and court outcomes. Both chapters include relevant findings from 
the stakeholder consultations, and from the legislative and literature review. The former 
presents key results from the national survey that relate to law enforcement, while the latter 
presents some findings from the analysis of prosecution and court outcome data. The final 
chapter addresses the question of what could be improved by highlighting some good 
practice examples and ways forward that were identified during the project.
Nature and extent of criminal 
activity in Australia’s fishing industry
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In Australia, a number of inquiries and reports have looked at the regulation of the fishing 
industry, however to date the only publicly available reports that have examined crime in 
Australia’s fishing industry are from the AIC’s research on illegal abalone catch (Tailby & Gant 
2001) and investigation into illegal fishing for commercial gain or profit in New South Wales 
(Palmer 2004). Both these reports found evidence of illegal activity, notably the poaching of 
abalone, but relied primarily on anecdotes and particular cases to suggest that organised 
criminal groups were involved in the fishing industry. It was therefore important to investigate 
in a more systematic manner whether stakeholders across the nation believed there was 
much illegal activity, whether any of this activity was connected to organised criminal groups, 
and what the activity involved.
Australia-wide consultations with industry stakeholders, fisheries and law enforcement 
agencies highlighted that: 
illegal activity occurred within all fishing sectors (commercial, recreational and Indigenous) 
in all Australian jurisdictions, and that the recreational sector can provide good cover for 
organised criminal activity
organised crime involvement was more likely within a high value, low volume fishery such 
as abalone.
The main points about perceived types of illegal activity in the fishing industry that emerged 
from the consultations included:
most commercial and recreational fishers are compliant (between 85–90 percent 
according to key stakeholders during 2004 consultations, although lower percentages 
were obtained from the survey of fisheries officers when asked about levels of criminal 
activity in the fishing industry in their local area)
high value seafood destined for overseas markets is more likely to attract organised 
criminal networks
the majority of illegal activity is opportunistic and might involve individuals or small family 
groups who sell the illicit product to clubs, pubs and restaurants
fishing boats are sometimes used for criminal purposes, mainly illicit drug distribution
certain commercial fishing sectors are likely to have workers involved in illicit drug use, 
which makes them more vulnerable in involvement in other criminal activity
fishing businesses – vessels, processing, aquaculture – have the potential to be used for 
illegal activities, such as money laundering.
•
•
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Strategies used by offenders
During consultations, stakeholders described instances of fisheries crime that highlighted 
how offender strategies varied depending on the species being targeted, what regulations 
applied, and the level of organisational capacity of the offenders. For example, in relation  
to abalone:
Both Queensland and Western Australia stakeholders referred to instances where 
tourists or overseas students had been involved in hiding illegal abalone in carry-on 
luggage on overseas flights.
A sophisticated operation involving the illegal export of abalone was uncovered by 
Operation Oakum in 2002. The abalone was poached in Tasmania by out of state  
divers who dived at night and undertook surveillance of police. The range of strategies 
employed to avoid detection en route out of the country included manipulation of 
weights on dockets, involvement of an aircraft company, concealment of abalone  
in crates in furniture vans that went to Queensland, from where it was supplied by 
consignment to Hong Kong. Corrupt insiders appear to have been involved at both 
ends, with a former police inspector implicated in Tasmania and a Customs official  
in Hong Kong.
In the recreational sector, a number of stakeholders referred to incidents of groups of five 
to eight people masquerading as recreational fishers and harvesting 10 abalone each.  
In Victoria, one crew used a vessel and four different people a day, involving a total of  
40 people and 10 vehicles that travelled to remote parts of the coastline. According to 
stakeholders, illegal divers are becoming more sophisticated in Tasmania and Victoria, 
with some using re-breathers to hide their bubbles, working at night with underwater 
lights and using global positioning systems. In South Australia stakeholders referred to 
family run abalone reef pickers, who conceal the abalone in their clothes. In New South 
Wales stakeholders referred to the targeting of national parks by illegal divers, and to 
Aboriginal family groups in some locations, who were reputed to be well organised with 
half a dozen groups working on the coast in specific areas.
Victorian stakeholders indicated that problems in the rock lobster industry were focused in 
the licensed sector. They observed that it was much more difficult to harvest rock lobsters, 
but that they were easier to sell, for example, to restaurants and clubs, given the size of the 
domestic market. It is not usual for rock lobsters to be exported illegally, given their size and 
packaging requirements. New South Wales stakeholders mentioned two methods by which 
commercial fishers could be involved in the black market – long liners picking up other 
people’s pots and sending illicit untagged product to legitimate processors in Sydney and 
Queensland. Western Australian stakeholders discussed supposedly recreational fishers 
going to inshore reefs and taking large quantities. 
•
•
•
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Stakeholders provided a range of cases that exhibited different methodologies and levels  
of organisation in other commercial fisheries. For example, in the Northern Territory, 
stakeholders considered that large scale and well-organised shark finning had developed  
in northern Australia, with family groups and companies involved. They also discussed the 
crab industry, where crabs are harvested in remote areas, mainly on mud flats, and excess 
potting is believed to be anything up to double or triple the number of licensed pots, with 
crabbers using string to link pots. Asian crabbers working around the coastline, staying in 
often rudimentary camps in remote and hard to access locations, often do not keep records, 
which makes it very difficult to monitor compliance or to know to whom licences have been 
subcontracted. In 2004 Northern Territory police uncovered a cross nominating system with 
operators nominating each other on their licences so that they can pull each other’s pots. 
Live crabs are sent to Darwin in crates and may be airfreighted to other parts of Australia  
or handed over to a trader-processor in Darwin.
As well as the well organised illegal take of abalone and rock lobster in the recreational  
or unlicensed sectors, some Commonwealth stakeholders believed ongoing recreational 
activity could be masking commercial scale activity in many other species. This is indicated 
by practices such as the lack of documentation in restaurants for live fish products and the 
use of freezer trailers to transport fish home. Fishing competitions were also identified  
as a potential avenue of participation in the cash economy. Specific examples given by 
stakeholders during consultations in the various jurisdictions included well-organised 
operations in South Australia involving the illegal recreational take of KGW, often by 
unemployed people or persons on a pension. Stakeholders indicated it was more common 
in rural areas with fish being sold to restaurants, clubs and hotels in towns and cities. 
Another example was in New South Wales where the theft of oysters can be well organised, 
using lifting equipment on vehicles to steal whole racks of oysters from farming enterprises.
According to fisheries officers who participated in the national survey, the most common 
strategy used by offenders to avoid detection of their fishing-related criminal activity (see 
Table 4) was concealed spaces in boats and vehicles (52%). The next two most common 
strategies involved the active use of intelligence and monitoring of the activities of fisheries 
officers – these were counter surveillance (for example, lookouts or guards; 51%) and 
knowledge of fisheries officers’ movements and equipment (38%). These strategies require 
premeditation and funding; either for modification of vehicles or boats, or payment of 
associates.
The fisheries officers also believed that offenders are more likely to pose as recreational 
fishers, either in concert or acting alone (36% and 30% respectively) than as commercial 
fishers (30% and 11% respectively). Other common strategies include mixing the legal and 
illegal catch during processing (32%) and transportation (28%), documentation fraud (31%) 
and dummy runs (where an activity diverts officers’ attention away from the actual illegal 
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operation; 30%). Relatively few officers reported the frequent use of false identification and 
registration, posing as legitimate commercial fishers or tampering with VMS.
Further analysis of the strategies officers saw as being used frequently revealed that officers 
who reported a lot of use of concealed spaces were also more likely to report use of counter 
surveillance and dummy runs. Document fraud and mixing the catch were strategies that 
were highly inter-correlated as were false identification and registrations.
Table 4: Types of strategies used by offenders to avoid detection  
of fishing-related criminal activity (row percent)
Strategy
Use  
a lot
Use 
sometimes
Use  
a little
Don’t  
use
Concealed spaces in boats, vehicles 52 41 6 1
Counter surveillance, e.g. lookouts, or guards 51 35 13 1
Knowledge of fisheries’ officers movements 
and equipment
38 41 18 3
Pose as legitimate recreational fishers:
– operating in concert with others 36 39 20 5
– operating alone 30 41 23 5
Mixing legal with illegal catch during: 
– processing 32 49 16 3
– transportation 28 46 23 3
Fisheries documentation fraud 31 47 18 4
Dummy runs 30 36 27 7
Pose as legitimate commercial fishers 
– operating in concert with others 13 36 33 18
– operating alone 11 30 40 19
False identification and registrations 13 35 41 11
Tampering with Vessel Monitoring Systems 4 25 39 32
Survey question: In your view, how often do offenders in your local area use each of the following strategies to avoid 
detection of their fishing-related criminal activity?
Source: AIC National Survey of Fisheries Officers 2005 [computer file] weighted data, n=567
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Types of offenders
As the more serious and organised criminal activity is likely to involve more sophisticated 
strategies, a framework for identifying the different types of offenders and activities  
is essential. Victoria has identified a typology of criminal activity that underpins their 
regulatory activity:
opportunistic
low level organised
high level organised groups.
The latter might involve a range of fishers and organised processing and marketing 
(including export). Another and complementary approach is to categorise different type of 
offenders who differ in levels of sophistication and method. For example, abalone poachers 
have been grouped into:
organised poachers who work in crews and facilitate distribution
licensed divers who use fraudulent documentation
shore-based divers who poach abalone
extended family groups who harvest recreational bag limits and sell to restaurants and 
other businesses 
individuals who opportunistically poach over the recreational bag limit (Tailby & Gant 
2002).
In terms of high level organised offending, the stakeholder consultations revealed concerns 
in a number of jurisdictions about existing involvement of OMCGs or AOC groups. For 
example, in Western Australia, an OMCG was said to have been involved in the theft of 
pearls; in the Northern Territory, OMCGs were reported to have purchased and subsequently 
sold fishing licences; and in South Australia, enforcement stakeholders believed that an 
OMCG had been involved in the illegal abalone trade. In Queensland a ROC group was 
thought to have purchased fishing vessels in order to distribute illicit drugs.
Vulnerable species
While abalone and shark have been targeted by organised crime groups, the consultations 
indicated that stakeholders were concerned about a range of other species. These include 
Murray cod, KGW, barramundi, rock lobster, mud crab, live coral reef fish, snapper and 
prawns (see Table 5). While Hong Kong is the main market for illegally fished abalone and 
shark fin, stakeholders reported an extensive illicit Australian market for these other species. 
•
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The market includes clubs, restaurants, hotels, fish and chip shops, as well as bartering for 
services in kind.
Table 5: Stakeholder perceptions of vulnerable species and fisheries
Common- 
wealth Vic Tas SA WA NT Qld NSW
Abalone
Shark
Abalone
Rock 
lobster
Eel
Native fish
Live 
seahorses, 
yabbies, 
squid and 
snapper
Abalone
Rock 
lobster
Abalone
Rock 
lobster
Marine 
scale fish 
(e.g. KGW)
Shark
Abalone
Rock 
lobster
Pearling
Shark
Dhufish, 
snapper, 
shell, coral, 
ornamental 
fish
Mud crab 
Shark
Barramundi
Timor box 
fishery, 
prawns, 
pearling, 
abalone, 
bêche-de-
mer
Torres Strait 
fishery (e.g. 
tropical rock 
lobster and 
sea slugs)
Trawl sector 
Live coral 
reef fish
Crabs
Abalone
Rock 
lobster 
Offshore 
fisheries 
(tuna, 
shark, 
prawn)
Eel, 
oysters, 
aquaculture
Source: National stakeholder consultations, 2004
Figure 1 shows the species fisheries nominated by officers as the most vulnerable to 
organised criminal activity in their local area. Officers could nominate more than one species. 
Overall, rock lobster and abalone were perceived to be the species most vulnerable (63% 
and 62% respectively), followed by shark, and with it, shark fin (57%). In contrast, only three 
percent of fisheries officers believed that perch were vulnerable to organised criminal activity. 
Further analysis of the data revealed jurisdictional differences in species perceived to be 
vulnerable.
Jurisdictional differences in officers’ perceptions of species vulnerability to organised  
criminal activity are, as might be expected, influenced by whether the state or territory has  
a significant fishery of a particular species. It also should be borne in mind that a number of 
jurisdictions – the Commonwealth (AFMA), Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory 
– had only a small number of respondents. Similar to what emerged through consultations 
and summarised in Table 5, abalone was identified as the most vulnerable by nearly all 
fisheries officers in Tasmania, Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia. A major 
proportion of fisheries officers in all jurisdictions except the Australian Capital Territory, the 
Commonwealth, Northern Territory and Queensland also identified rock lobster as most 
vulnerable. A large proportion of fisheries officers in AFMA (78%), Western Australia (66%), 
Queensland (64%) and the Northern Territory (100%, ie both respondents) selected shark as 
most vulnerable. Mud crab was selected by quite a few officers from the Northern Territory 
(100%) Queensland (80%) and New South Wales (46%). Barramundi was seen as most 
vulnerable by all Northern Territory officers, bluefin tuna by 29% of South Australian officers 
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and prawns by 46% of New South Wales officers. These data are consistent with the 
stakeholder interviews and the anecdotal evidence to date. 
Figure 1: Species vulnerable to organised criminal activity (percent)
Survey question: In your view, what species are most vulnerable to organised criminal activity in your local area?
Source: AIC National Survey of Fisheries Officers 2005 [computer file] weighted data, n=567
Type of criminal activity
The majority of fisheries officers (85%) believed that the types of criminal activity 
encountered by fisheries enforcement agencies had changed to some degree over the past 
five years, with a further 12 percent undecided (see Figure 2 below). The consultations with 
stakeholders suggest that at least some of the change is due to heightened awareness of, 
or an increase in, organised criminal activity in the fishing sector. When asked about their 
perceptions of organised criminal activity in their state or territory 26 percent of fisheries 
officers said there was a lot of criminal activity, 58 percent said there was some, 14 percent 
said there was little with no officers believing there was none (see Figure 3). Where officers 
indicated there was a lot of organised criminal activity in their jurisdiction, the overwhelming 
majority said that criminal activity had either greatly changed (38%) or changed (39%).  
In contrast to those officers who believed there was a little organised criminal activity the 
majority (61%) said criminal activity had somewhat changed. This lends support to the  
view that some of the change in criminal activity is linked to organised criminal activity.
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Figure 2: Level of change in type of criminal activity encountered by 
fisheries enforcement agencies over the past five years 
(percent)
Survey question: Do you believe that the types of criminal activity encountered by fisheries enforcement officers has 
changed over the past five years?
Source: AIC National Survey of Fisheries Officers 2005 [computer file] weighted data, n=567
There was significant jurisdictional variation in the extent to which a lot of organised criminal 
activity was seen to be occurring. Not unexpectedly the Australian Capital Territory officers 
reported none, followed by six percent of officers in Queensland, eight percent in Tasmania 
and nine percent in Western Australia. Many more officers in South Australia (42%), New 
South Wales (44%), the Commonwealth (44%) and Victoria (49%) reported a lot of activity.
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Figure 3: Perceptions of the extent of organised criminal activity in state/
territory (percent)
Survey question: Do you believe that there is organised criminal activity operating within the fishing industry of your 
state/territory?
Source: AIC National Survey of Fisheries Officers 2005 [computer file] weighted data, n=567
Fisheries officers were asked a number of questions about fishing-related criminal activity  
in their local area/region/district (see Table 6). Just over 60 percent believed that less than  
20 percent of the fishing industry was involved in fishing-related crime. A further 20 percent 
believed there was more criminal involvement by the fishing industry – between 20 and  
40 percent of the industry. The majority of officers (71%) believed that less than one fifth  
of this criminal activity could be linked to organised crime, with half of the officers believing 
the organised criminal activity in the past year involved other illegal commodities. Around  
a quarter of officers did not know how much organised criminal activity involved illegal 
commodities other than fish in their local area.
Cross tabulations showed that more than half of all officers (52%) believed that less than  
one fifth of the fishing industry in their area or district was involved in fishing-related criminal 
activity and less than one fifth of that activity constituted organised crime activity. Among  
the small number of officers who believed that a significant proportion of the local fishing 
industry was involved in fishing-related criminal activity, the majority (65%) said it was 
organised criminal activity. This would indicate that a very small number of officers are  
either specialising in work that addresses organised criminal activity or that they are located 
in a hot spot for organised criminal activity. For the vast majority, however, criminal activity  
is more likely to be a matter that they dealt with on an intermittent basis, with most of it not 
being linked to organised crime.
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Table 6: Fishing-related criminal activity in local area/district/region  
(row percent)
Strategy <20 21–40 >40
Don’t 
know
Percent of fishing industry  
involved in fishing-related crimea
61 22 9 7
Percent of local criminal fishing  
activity that is organised crimeb
71 9 4 14
Percent of organised criminal activity  
that is involved in other illegal commoditiesc
47 10 15 28
a: Survey question: In your opinion, what proportion of the fishing industry in your work area/district/region is involved 
in fishing-related criminal activities?
b: Survey question: In your opinion, what proportion of this [fishing-related] criminal activity in your work area/district/
region is organised criminal activity?
c: Survey question: In the past year, in your view, what proportion of organised criminal activity in the fishing industry  
in your work area/district/region also involved other illegal commodities?
Source: AIC National Survey of Fisheries Officers 2005 [computer file] weighted data, n=567
The fisheries officers were also asked whether they believed their local area/district/region 
was being used as a transit point for the movement of illegal fish or fish product. All officers 
thought that it did happen, with the majority (58%) saying it happened frequently or 
sometimes (see Figure 4). There were noticeable variations on the extent to which 
movement occurred illegally across jurisdictions. Only 22 percent of Commonwealth 
fisheries officers reported that illegal movement occurred frequently or sometimes in their 
area or region. Around one third (34%) of Western Australian officers reported frequent/
sometimes movement, compared with 58 percent in Queensland, 61 percent in Tasmania, 
67 percent in New South Wales, 68 percent in South Australia, 76 percent in Victoria and 
100 percent in the Northern Territory.
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Figure 4: Area/district/region being used as a transit point for interstate/
international movement of illegal fish or fish product (percent)
Survey question: Do you believe that your work area/district/region is used as a transit point for the movement  
of illegal fish product or other illegal commodities to interstate or international locations?
Source: AIC National Survey of Fisheries Officers 2005 [computer file] weighted data, n=567
Conclusion
Australia-wide consultations with industry stakeholders, fisheries and law enforcement 
agencies highlighted that illegal activity occurs within all fishing sectors (commercial, 
recreational and Indigenous) in all Australian jurisdictions, and that the recreational sector 
can provide good cover for organised criminal activity. It was further found that organised 
crime involvement was more likely within a high value, low volume fishery such as abalone.
The main points about types of illegal activity in the fishing industry that emerged included: 
most commercial and recreational fishers are compliant
high value seafood destined for overseas markets is more likely to attract organised 
criminal networks
the majority of illegal activity is opportunistic and might involve individuals or small family 
groups, who sell the illicit product to clubs, pubs and restaurants
fishing boats are sometimes used for criminal purposes, mainly illicit drug distribution
certain commercial fishing sectors are likely to have workers involved in illicit drug use, 
which makes them more vulnerable in involvement in other criminal activity
•
•
•
•
•
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fishing businesses – vessels, processing, aquaculture – have the potential to be used for 
illegal activities, such as money laundering.
On the extent of criminal activity in Australia’s fishing industry, the key stakeholder 
consultations and the national survey of fisheries officers found that:
there has been change in the type of criminal activity in the past five years
there is a perception of widespread fisheries-related criminal activity, but it is confined  
to a minority of the fishing industry
there is, however, a perception that a substantial minority of this activity involves 
organised criminal groups
offenders use a range of strategies to avoid detection and many of these require a level 
of premeditation and resources both human and financial
currently the most vulnerable species are rock lobster, abalone and shark, with a number 
of other species also identified as being vulnerable to organised crime.
•
•
•
•
•
•
Law enforcement
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The nature and range of Australian legislation on fisheries-related offences is primarily 
designed to regulate the fishing industry to manage the resource to ensure long term 
sustainability through the prevention and detection of activities that impact adversely on  
the fisheries environment. This includes the protection of habitat and endangered species, 
as well as the prevention of overexploitation of certain species by both commercial and 
recreational fishers.
In terms of recreational and domestic commercial fishing, there are jurisdictional differences 
in how fisheries are managed through quotas, licences, reporting requirements, tagging and 
documentation, and regulations surrounding the quantity, size and sex of specified fish 
stocks. There is, however, no definition within any legislation of ‘fisheries crime’ and what it 
might entail. Although there is a myriad of offences, not all of these suggest criminal activity 
and there is an underlying assumption, in the distinction made in some jurisdictions between 
first, second and subsequent offences, that a one-off or occasional offence could have been 
committed in error rather than with criminal intent.
Legislation in most states and territories attempts to be all encompassing in coverage, which 
has resulted in a large number of pieces of secondary legislation to augment the primary 
statutes. During consultations, stakeholders indicated that they found much of the legislation 
complex and complicated, and rendered more difficult by the wealth of secondary 
legislation. There is often a failure to distinguish between minor infringements and more 
serious forms of illegal catching or possession of species.
The national review of legislation revealed differences across jurisdictions including:
nature of offences and regulatory requirements
penalty regimes
onus of proof
assets confiscation
powers of officers, for example, arrest, search and seizure.
Legislation is further complicated by complexity in law enforcement arrangements as they 
apply to maritime crime, as noted by one commentator:
Problems associated with controlling maritime crime include its complexity, the 
disparate range of agencies and levels of government that have jurisdiction over 
policing what happens at sea, and the international laws, treaties and regulations that 
add to the difficulties.
•
•
•
•
•
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There are at least 20 agencies and three levels of government – federal, state and 
local – who are responsible for policing the matters that could broadly be defined  
as maritime crime. These include the armed forces, federal and state police, federal 
and state fisheries authorities, immigration, Customs, environmental protection 
authorities, quarantine officials, the Australian Taxation Office, local councils, port 
authorities… (MacKinnon 2003: 2).
While state and territory responsibilities for fishing industries are generally restricted  
to all waters within three nautical mile territorial seas, these jurisdictions can also have 
responsibility for some fisheries out to the limit of Australia’s 200 nautical mile fishing zone. 
States and territories are responsible for recreational fishing while the Commonwealth limits 
its authority to commercial fishing as well as controlling the activities of foreign fishing fleets. 
States and territories vary in terms of the personnel to whom they grant powers in fisheries 
regulation and in the extent and/or availability of those powers. Most jurisdictions appoint 
fisheries officers, but three have different arrangements:
In the Northern Territory, the Marine and Fisheries Enforcement Unit of the Northern 
Territory Police enforces all Territory and Commonwealth legislation covering the fishing 
industry.
In Tasmania, the police Marine and Rescue Division comprises a number of squads 
which police the fishing of rock lobster, abalone and scalefish.
The Australian Capital Territory uses conservation officers, whose powers are 
constrained.
Appendix A provides a comprehensive list of the legislation provisions across jurisdictions as 
they relate to enforcement powers. The differences in powers of arrest, search, entry and 
seizure accorded to fisheries officers is demonstrated by a summary of key powers for the 
different jurisdictions:
Western Australian fisheries officers have power of entry and search of residential and 
non-residential properties, power of arrest and power of seizure.
Queensland inspectors have powers of entry, boarding, seizure and the power to stop 
(but not subsequently to arrest) persons; the power to stop is not specifically laid out in 
other jurisdictions.
Northern Territory fisheries officers have no power of arrest but may question persons, 
and have powers of search and seizure.
New South Wales fisheries officers have a wide range of powers including the right to 
board vessels, enter and search premises, arrest and seize property.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Victorian authorised officers may arrest, search people and places (the right to search 
each person does not appear in any other legislation) and have powers of entry, seizure, 
forfeiture and hot pursuit.
Australian Capital Territory conservation officers may gain entry to places and may seize 
fish etc; however they have no powers of search or arrest.
Tasmanian fisheries officers have the power of entry, power to stop vessels and vehicles, 
and to arrest and search residential and non-residential premises.
South Australian fisheries officers have powers of arrest, entry and search; it appears 
there is no one set of powers to apply to all officers operating under fisheries legislation.
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority inspectors have powers of search (including  
of aircraft and of individuals), arrest, and confiscation and forfeiture.
Commonwealth officers (AFMA) may stop boats and have the power to arrest. They can 
also search vehicles, boats and aircraft.
Stakeholder consultations revealed that they were aware of jurisdictional differences, both in 
legislation and operational practice, and that this informed their assessments of jurisdictional 
strengths and weaknesses (see Table 7). A recurring theme related to weaknesses was 
whether:
tackling organised criminal activity should be considered a duty of fisheries officers
it was realistic to have this expectation given their other roles
they had the expertise and capacity to take on such a role
they were adequately protected while performing such a role.
Fisheries officers are primarily concerned with maximising voluntary compliance and  
creating effective deterrence. They are responsible for enforcing a wide range of regulatory 
requirements related to conservation and management but they do have an enforcement 
role, as set out under relevant Acts. Stakeholders noted that the wide range of regulatory 
activities that fisheries officers are required to undertake may undermine their enforcement 
capacity in a context of resource constraints. That capacity is likely to be further affected if 
they are required to police suspected organised crime activity. It seems likely that the training 
of fisheries officers would not routinely prepare them for the intricacies or potential danger 
surrounding the investigation of organised criminal involvement in the fishing industry. In 
terms of being able to deal with such potential dangers there are also differences across 
jurisdictions in whether protective equipment or defensive equipment (such as capsicum 
spray or stab/bulletproof vests) is issued routinely to fisheries officers.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Fisheries officers reported that they were taking on increasing roles across regulatory, law 
enforcement and conservation activities. The majority of officers (59%) indicated that they 
had an increasing role in compliance, and 54 percent said they had an increasing role in  
the investigation in criminal activity. Although the majority of officers believed they had an 
increasing role in the investigation of criminal activity and in law enforcement (48%), nearly 
one fifth (18%) said their duties had declined over the past five years in these two areas. The 
duties where there were perceived to be the fewest changes were in fisheries conservation 
and management, with over 40 percent of officers reporting there was no change in the past 
five years in these duties (see Table 8).
Table 8: Change in duties carried out over last five years (row percent)
Duties Increasing role Decreasing role No change
Compliance 59 12 29
Investigation of criminal activity 54 18 28
Law enforcement role 48 18 34
Fisheries management 47 13 40
Fisheries conservation 43 15 42
Survey question: In your view, please indicate what change (if any) has occurred in the duties you have carried out  
in your position, over the last five years? 
Source: AIC National Survey of Fisheries Officers 2005 [computer file] weighted data; n=567
The investigation of suspected organised criminal activity may pose particular challenges for 
fisheries officers. As part of the survey, fisheries officers were asked to rate the importance 
of a range of factors in monitoring and dealing with organised criminal activity. The factor 
that scored the highest was the personal safety of fisheries officers (77%; see Table 9), 
followed by intelligence capacity (69%), financial/human resources (68%), skills base of 
fisheries officers (65%), and dedicated investigators and analysts (62%) and 58 percent saw 
infrastructure as very high in importance. A much lower proportion of officers ranked access 
to related legislation as being very important in the day to day monitoring and dealing with 
organised criminal activity in the industry.

Table 9: Ratings of factors to monitor and deal with organised criminal 
activity (row percent)
Factors
Very high                 Very low
1 2 3 4 5
Personal safety of officers 77 15 6 2 1
Intelligence capacity 69 24 5 0 0
Financial/human resources 68 27 3 1 1
Skills base of fisheries officers 65 31 3 0 1
Dedicated Investigators and analysts 62 28 8 1 2
Support resources (vehicles, boats, surveillance equipment) 58 32 8 2 0
Attitude of the courts 37 45 14 3 1
Access to related legislation: Surveillance Devices Act 34 40 17 6 2
Access to related legislation: Assets Confiscation Act 26 39 25 8 2
Access to related legislation: Crimes (Controlled Operation) Act 26 39 24 7 3
Survey question: Please rate the importance of each of the following factors of monitoring and dealing with organised 
criminal activity in the fishing industry?
Note: percentages may not total 100 due to rounding
Source: AIC National Survey of Fisheries Officers 2005 [computer file] weighted data; n=567
Investment in human and material resources were also identified as very important when 
fisheries officers were asked to rate factors that would help their organisation deter 
organised criminal activity. Table 10 shows that 71 percent of officers rated the personal 
safety of officers and the number of officers as at the highest level of importance, 64 percent 
surveillance capacity, 63 percent training and 52 percent supporting infrastructure. Nearly 
two thirds of officers also gave very high ratings to legislation and 65 percent indicated that 
interagency cooperation was very high in importance. The education of the judiciary and of 
the general public was given lower ratings in importance.

Table 10: Ratings of factors to help the organisation deter organised 
criminal activity (row percent)
Factors
Very high                                  Very low
1 2 3 4 5
Number of fisheries officers 71 22 5 2 1
Personal safety of officers 71 18 9 1 1
Legislation 65 30 4 1 0
Interagency cooperation 65 29 6 0 0
Surveillance capacity 64 32 3 1 1
Training for fisheries officers 63 29 8 0 0
Support services (vehicles, boats) 52 35 10 2 0
Education of the judiciary 43 40 13 3 0
Education of the general public 35 39 20 5 1
Survey question: Please rate the importance of each of the following factors of monitoring and dealing with organised 
criminal activity in the fishing industry?
Note: percentages may not total 100 due to rounding
Source: AIC National Survey of Fisheries Officers 2005 [computer file] weighted data; n=567
The national survey also sought to elicit officers’ views on the effectiveness of their 
jurisdiction in detecting organised criminal activity as well as the effectiveness of legislation 
and interagency collaboration. An almost equal number of officers believed that their state or 
territory was either effective (45%) or ineffective (40%) in detecting organised criminal activity 
(see Figure 5). Victorian and Tasmanian officers were the most likely to believe their state or 
territory was effective, followed by South Australia and Western Australia. Nationally, almost 
equal proportions of officers also believed that the state/territory legislation was either 
adequate or inadequate to deal with organised crime. Given that 65 percent of officers rated 
legislation as a very important factor when it came to deterring organised criminal activity 
(see Table 10) this would suggest that many officers would view legislative reform as a 
priority to tackle organised criminal activity. Based on the survey results it would seem the 
majority of officers from Victoria, Western Australia, Australian Capital Territory and Tasmania 
believe their legislation is either adequate or very adequate, while officers from Queensland, 
South Australia and the Commonwealth were less confident of the adequacy of their 
legislation.
Further analysis was undertaken to ascertain whether officers’ perceptions of state/territory 
effectiveness on a range of variables was influenced by their assessment of levels of 
organised criminal activity in their jurisdiction. There was only a clear trend with two 
variables. As the perceived level of organised criminal activity declined, so did the officers’ 
assessment of jurisdictional effectiveness in detecting this activity – that is, the more activity, 
the more effective detection there is. However, the opposite trend was true in terms of the 
adequacy of legislation, with officers more likely to rate it as adequate or very adequate 
when there was believed to be lower levels of organised criminal activity. The level of 
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organised criminal activity had only a marginal effect on officers’ perceptions of jurisdiction’s 
effectiveness in dealing with organised criminal activity, with officers’ marginally more likely  
to say it was very effective or effective when there was some organised criminal activity.
Figure 5: Effectiveness of state/territory detection and legislation to deal 
with organised criminal activity (percent)
Survey questions: Do you believe your State/Territory is effective in dealing with detected organised criminal activity  
in the fishing industry?/Do you think that your State/Territory has adequate fisheries legislation to deal with organised 
criminal activity in the fishing industry?
a: refers to responses to the question about the effectiveness of a jurisdiction’s response
b: refers to responses to the question about the effectiveness of legislation
Source: AIC National Survey of Fisheries Officers 2005 [computer file] weighted data; n=567
The survey contained a number of questions regarding the collaboration between agencies, 
either within the state/territory, or across jurisdictions. Nearly two thirds of officers (65%) 
rated interagency cooperation very highly as a deterrent to organised criminal activity (see 
Table 10). Table 11 presents the officers’ perceptions of the level of effectiveness of this 
collaboration. Cooperation between agencies within a jurisdiction was seen as the most 
effective with 54 percent rating it as effective. The level of effectiveness decreases when 
officers responded to the multi-jurisdictional aspects of the question, either between 
fisheries agencies (41%) or even less when it included other agencies (37%). More fisheries 
officers believed that multi-jurisdictional collaboration which included other agencies was 
less than effective (60%).
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Table 11: Effectiveness of interagency collaboration in dealing with 
organised criminal activity (row percent)
Collaboration
Very 
effective Effective Ineffective
Very 
ineffective
Don’t 
know
Within state/territory 9 54 25 5 7
Multi-jurisdictional  
(between fisheries agencies
6 41 36 7 10
Multi-jurisdictional  
(including other agencies)
3 37 40 10 10
Survey question: In your view, how effective is the collaboration between agencies (within State/Territory  
or multi-jurisdictional) in dealing with organised criminal activity in the fishing industry?
Source: AIC National Survey of Fisheries Officers 2005 [computer file] weighted data; n=567
Another question related to the perceived frequency of information provided to fisheries 
officers by other nominated agencies. Table 12 shows considerable differences in perceived 
frequency in the provision of information. For example, fisheries officers perceived that the 
provision of information from the AFP and the ACC is infrequent. On the other hand, it is 
clear that AFMA and state/territory fisheries agencies are perceived as maintaining a steady 
flow of information.
Table 12: Provision of information by agencies (row percent)
Agency
Freq- 
uently
Some- 
times
Occas- 
ionally
Infreq- 
uently Never
Don’t 
know
State/territory fisheries agencies 24 25 22 15 5 9
AFMA 21 24 23 12 6 14
State/territory Police Department 19 30 22 17 4 8
Australian Customs Service 10 18 28 22 8 14
DAFF 5 6 11 27 28 23
Director of Public Prosecutions 4 7 6 25 35 24
Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service 2 12 17 28 22 18
AFP 2 8 15 35 18 22
DIMA 1 3 5 29 37 24
Australian Tax Office 0 4 6 29 40 21
Centrelink 0 3 8 29 40 20
ACC 0 3 11 35 27 25
Survey question: Rate each of the following agencies in terms of how often they refer information about criminal activity 
in the fishing industry to your agency?
Note: percentages may not total 100 due to rounding
Source: AIC National Survey of Fisheries Officers 2005 [computer file] weighted data; n=567
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Fisheries officers were also asked whether they were satisfied that these agencies passed 
on information as a matter of routine. Only one percent reported being very satisfied 
followed by 24 percent who said they were satisfied. Most were dissatisfied (39%), and  
35 percent indicated that they did not know. Seventy-one percent of officers felt that the 
lack of formal agreements inhibited the sharing of information between jurisdictions (see 
Figure 6). In addition, officers thought that other agencies were unwilling to share information 
(60%), or that they felt uncertain about other jurisdictions maintaining confidentiality of the 
information (59%). The lack of uniform data storage systems between jurisdictions was also 
perceived by officers as an inhibiting factor (58%).
Figure 6: Factors which may inhibit the sharing of information between 
jurisdictions (percent)
Survey question: Please indicate which of the following factors may inhibit the sharing of information between 
jurisdictions?
Source: AIC National Survey of Fisheries Officers 2005 [computer file] weighted data; n=567
On factors that may restrict the success of joint operations, a large percentage of officers 
(83%) perceived that differing priorities were a major factor (see Figure 7). Limited and  
varied resource allocation and legislative differences were also seen as important factors  
by 75 percent of officers and 63 percent felt that legislation differences also restricted the 
success of joint operations. A smaller but still substantial number of officers (30%) felt that 
disagreement over command and control affected successful outcomes as well as human 
resource factors associated with differential pay and conditions.
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Figure 7: Factors that may restrict the success of joint operations 
(percent)
Survey question: Please indicate which of the following factors may restrict the success of joint operations?
Source: AIC National Survey of Fisheries Officers 2005 [computer file] weighted data; n=567
The personal safety of officers was raised frequently during consultations, and it was seen 
by officers as a very important factor in deterring, monitoring and dealing with organised 
crime activity. The national survey included a question about whether current occupational 
health and safety procedures provided a safe environment for compliance officers in dealing 
with organised crime. The majority of officers (48%) believed they did, while 29 percent of 
officers believed they did not. Of those officers who believed the procedures provided a safe 
environment, the majority (81%) said this applied most of the time and 11 percent said it 
applied always. Officers from Tasmania, Victoria and South Australia were more likely to 
believe that current procedures provided a safe or very safe environment.
Conclusion
This chapter has documented:
the complex and differing regulatory regimes that operate across the Commonwealth, 
state and territory governments
the increasing role of fisheries officers in compliance and law enforcement activity
that officers believe that human resources are very important in monitoring and dealing 
with organised crime
•
•
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that, while officers believed effective legislation and interagency cooperation to be very 
important to deterring organised crime, fewer of them reported that relevant legislation 
and interagency cooperation are very effective
officers noted relatively little sharing of intelligence with law enforcement bodies but 
much high cooperation across state/territory fishing agencies and AFMA
factors inhibiting the sharing of information included lack of formal agreements, agencies 
unwillingness to share, issues of confidentiality/privacy and lack of uniform data storage 
systems
the success of joint operations was seen as hindered by differing priorities, limited 
resources and legislative differences.
A fundamental question is whether the monitoring and enforcement roles of fisheries officers 
can, or indeed should, be combined. From the consultations it was apparent that there are 
pros and cons in having a policing service responsible for fisheries enforcement. Fisheries 
officers are more likely than seconded police officers to have expertise in fish, their habitat 
and the various aspects of the industry, as well as the complex regulatory regime. On the 
other hand police are more likely to have the experience and expertise to deal with criminals 
and criminal activity. Another advantage is that they have access to national and their own 
intelligence databases, putting them in a better position to be informed by, and to contribute 
to, intelligence and operational efforts against known criminal groups.
Within the ambit of the governing legislation (in terms of the number of regulatory 
requirements) and within the constraints of limited resources, the question also arises 
whether fisheries officers have the time to deal effectively with serious and organised crime 
as well as the more routine (but probably more prevalent) regulatory issues such as licensing 
requirements. Against this backdrop of time constraints, there is also the question of the 
relative expertise such officers might possess in identification and knowledge of organised 
crime activity. Given that the survey revealed a widespread perception among officers that 
they have an increasing role in law enforcement and compliance activity, and there are 
concerns about the human resource implications of this increase, regular reviews need  
to address:
training and access to specialised skills 
occupational health and safety
referral procedures to police and other relevant agencies.
The detection of noncompliance, and in particular more serious forms of criminal activity,  
is enhanced by intelligence gathering and sharing. It seems there have been major 
improvements in most jurisdictions since the Tailby and Gant (2001) study into abalone  
in the way that information is recorded and stored on abalone poaching, for example with 
the move to the use of secure information databases and interest in some quarters in the 
•
•
•
•
•
•
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adoption and use of the standard IUU form routinely completed in Victoria. However, it 
seems that intelligence on offenders and on illegal activity in other fisheries is not as well 
developed. As already noted, in the jurisdictions where the police are responsible for 
fisheries enforcement (Tasmania and the Northern Territory) the officers have access to 
mainstream police intelligence databases. However, this advantage may be lost if fisheries 
crime intelligence is given little priority. It may only register within state and national 
intelligence data collections and analysis if serious criminal networks, for example those 
involved in illicit drug production and distribution, are in some way connected to the fishing 
industry, in either the commercial or recreational sectors.
The survey of fisheries officers highlighted insufficient sharing of information by agencies  
and of collaboration across jurisdictions. The lack of formal agreements was seen as  
a major problem. Protocols to enable the sharing of information that do not breach privacy 
provisions would clearly be of benefit. However, there has to be some degree of agreement 
on the purpose of sharing the information and what the expected benefits are to all parties. 
Differing priorities will continue to affect the success of joint operations, as well as the 
willingness of agencies to collaborate with information and resource commitments. As the 
majority of officers rated cooperation very highly as a deterrent to organised criminal activity, 
it would seem prudent to invest in more formal arrangements to ensure cooperation can and 
does occur across jurisdictions.
Prosecution and court outcomes
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Even where successful detection of criminal or illegal activity occurs, this does not 
automatically result in prosecution or in a court determination. Stakeholder consultations 
reported high rates of successful prosecution, such as:
57–80 percent in South Australia
90–95 percent in New South Wales
90 percent in the Northern Territory
95 percent in Victoria.
It was consistently noted during consultations, however, that it can be very difficult to 
successfully prosecute more serious matters. For example New South Wales stakeholders 
said that the courts would not take matter seriously unless it could be proven that so called 
recreational fishing offences were related to commercial activity. Queensland stakeholders 
reported that only a small percentage of their cases go to trial, with most cases 
uncontested. In Victoria much of the lower level offending is dealt with by penalty 
infringement notice.
Difficulties have been identified in the literature, in prosecuting certain kinds of more  
serious, environmental offences through the courts. It has been suggested that the  
defence formulates mitigation arguments to refute and neutralise the criminalisation of the 
defendant’s activities (de Prez 2000: 66). It has been claimed that in Canada prosecuting 
lawyers are not ‘especially experienced, effective, or predictable in obtaining convictions 
related to fisheries crime’. Even where there is a successful prosecution, there may be 
reluctance to impose as ‘severe penalties, such as license suspensions and seizures of 
fishing equipment, to deprive fishers and those dependent upon them of an economic 
livelihood’ (McMullan & Perrier 2002: 703).
Two recent sentences imposed on commercial and recreational fishers in Australia suggest 
that the circumstances of the offenders can influence the magistrate’s decision making. In  
a case involving three commercial fishers catching a great white shark, the penalty handed 
down by the magistrate took into account their employment situation and reliance on social 
security benefits (Sayer 2005). In a case involving recidivist abalone poachers, the magistrate 
considered that the maximum penalty would have been too harsh because three of them 
were on government benefits and the other had four children with another on the way (Riley 
2005).
In Australia there is no universally applied penalty regime across states and territories. 
Appendix B outlines the legislative provisions for penalties in each jurisdiction. The value  
of a penalty unit varies from $75 to A$110. Given the multiples of penalty units utilised in  
the state/territory statutes, the value of one penalty unit will influence the total cost of the fine 
significantly. A number of Commonwealth/state/territory statutes provide for the imposition 
of substantial fines – for example, Tasmanian legislation provides for a fine of $500,000 for 
•
•
•
•
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the taking of abalone, and the Commonwealth legislation provides for a fine of $825,000 for 
foreign boats being used for commercial fishing in Australian waters. Furthermore, a number 
of state/territory statutes provide for the imposition of a term of imprisonment in addition to, 
or instead of a fine.
It was apparent during the stakeholder consultations, that many fisheries staff considered 
the existing penalty regimes inadequate, and that the courts were too lenient. The 
examination of data from four jurisdictions on charges and court outcomes suggests that 
severe penalties are rare. However, the findings are suggestive rather than conclusive. Due 
to missing or incomplete data and differences in recording practices, it was only possible to 
highlight some basic trends within jurisdictions, including the number of charges, location 
and outcomes. The data can be analysed in three ways – charges, offenders and events. 
The number of charges can vary for each event. Similarly there can be more than one 
offender per event or more offenders than events due to multiple offending episodes. For 
example in Victoria in 2003 there were 1,365 charges, 357 unique offenders and 431 
events. In Northern Territory there were 60 charges 29 offenders and 42 events. Because  
of the lack of identifier information it was not possible to track Queensland or AFMA data 
(see Table 13).
Data were received from Queensland, Northern Territory, Victoria and AFMA, for 1999–2004. 
It should be noted that data for the Northern Territory include offences dating back to 1987 
(2), 1994 (1), 1996 (4), and 1997 (16).
The large number of charges per offender in Victoria could result from minor infractions by 
recreational fishers acting illegally. There is a relatively low number of offences recorded by 
AFMA for the same period. As AFMA deals with Commonwealth commercial fisheries, its 
officers are unlikely to come across recreational offenders, who may form a considerable 
percentage of offenders from state/territory jurisdictions. For example, the majority of 
offences occurring in Commonwealth waters during the period under review related  
to breach of permit conditions (102 offences, n=152).
Table 13: Tracking charges, 2003
Jurisdiction All charges All offenders Number of events
Victoria 1,365 357 431
Queensland 348 Not defined –
Northern Territory 60 29 42
AFMA 26 No unique identifier –
Source: AIC, Victoria, Queensland, Northern Territory and AFMA prosecutions and sentencing data 1999–2004;  
AFMA 2003 [computer file]
Figure 8 shows the offences per year for all four jurisdictions for the years 2000 to 2004 
Victoria registered a sharp spike in charges for the year 2003 (up to 1,365), followed by  
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a drop the following year (down to 1,111). Queensland also registered a drop in charges 
between 2003 (348) and 2004 (205). Likewise, the Northern Territory dropped from 58 
charges in 2003 to 17 charges in 2004. AFMA, on the other hand experienced an increase, 
from 17 offences in 2001 to 47 offences in 2002, and then back down to 26 in 2003 and  
30 in 2004.
Figure 8: Victoria, Queensland, Northern Territory and AFMA,  
charges per year (number)
Source: AIC, Queensland, AFMA, Northern Territory and Victoria prosecution and sentencing data 1999–2004 
[computer file]
When the charges by jurisdiction are analysed by month, there are clear seasonal variations 
and similarities each year. The variations could be a result of many factors including the 
extent of fishing effort and levels of surveillance.
In the Northern Territory, October appears to be a peak month for charges, in particular  
for the earlier years examined: 1999 (25); 2000 (14); 2001 (19). Rates dropped for October 
in 2002 (4); 2003 (4) and 2004 (3), when there was a general decline over the three years  
in the number of charges.
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Figure 9: Northern Territory, charges by month, 1999–2004 (number)
Source: AIC Northern Territory prosecutions and sentencing data 1999–2004 [computer file]; n=448
In Figure 10, the number of offences per month in Queensland shows considerable variation. 
For example, there are sharp spikes during the summer months of December and January. 
Over the years examined there are also more charges recorded for April, May and August. 
Also of interest is the clear decline in charges during 2003 and particularly in the latter six 
months of 2004, after a peak of 35 offences in May that year. 
Figure 10: Queensland, charges by month, 1999–2004 (number)
Source: AIC, Queensland prosecutions and sentencing data 19999–04 [computer file]; n=2,544
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Figure 11 shows marked variations in the number of charges per month in Victoria.  
More charges were laid in January and February, while very few charges were recorded  
for September, October and November 2002, with a low of nine charges recorded  
for September 2002. At the other extreme, a total of 263 charges were recorded  
in January 2003.
Figure 11: Victoria, charges by month, 2000–04 (number)
Source: AIC, Victoria prosecutions and sentencing data 2000–04 [computer file]; n=5,696
AFMA’s data on the total number of charges each year show an increase in charges for 
2002, the vast majority being for breach of permit conditions (Figure 12). One third of the 
charges recorded (16 out of the 47) in 2002 related to the Eastern Tuna Billfish Fishery and 
16 charges related to the Northern Prawn Fishery.
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Figure 12: AFMA, charges, 2000–04 (number)
Source: AIC, AFMA prosecutions and sentencing data 2000–04 [computer file]; n=152
Types of offences
It was difficult to ascertain the types of charges laid against defendants due to missing  
data. However, Figure 13 shows the proportion of charges laid under specified pieces of 
legislation for the Northern Territory. Queensland data on charges were also collated against 
specific legislative provisions. For the period 1999–2004 charges were laid under nine 
separate statutes. Most guilty charges were laid under the Fisheries Act 1994 and Fisheries 
Regulations 1995. Table 14 shows the most common guilty charges by legislative provision, 
with a description of the offence. This table highlights a number of issues including:
the description of most offence categories are very general, although a number of 
description categories suggest some were committed by recreational fishers and were  
of a relatively minor nature
as legislation is complex within a jurisdiction and differs across jurisdictions, it makes  
it difficult to compare offences across jurisdictions
descriptions of offences would need to be standardised before any multi-jurisdictional  
or national data could be collected.
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Figure 13: Northern Territory, charges by legislation, 1999–2004 (percent)
Source: AIC, Northern Territory prosecutions and sentencing data 1999–2004 [computer file]; n=448
Table 14: Queensland, most common guilty charges by legislation,  
1999–2004
Legislation Section Description Number
Fisheries Act 1994 118(3) Fail to keep documents 52
Fisheries Act 1994 123 Destroyed marine plants 61
Fisheries Act 1994 173(3) Did not produce documents in reasonable time 34
Fisheries Act 1994 77 Breach closed waters 363
Fisheries Act 1994 78(1) Take/possess/sell regulated fish 733
Fisheries Act 1994 80 Taking fish in prohibited way 112
Fisheries Act 1994 82 Did an act only an authority holder can do 499
Fisheries Act 1994 84(1) Possess prohibited fishing apparatus 128
Fisheries Act 1994 85(4) Use/possess commercial fishing apparatus 124
Fisheries Act 1994 Unknown Unspecified offence in Fisheries Act 1994 64
Fisheries Regulation 1995 82(1) Allowed a person onboard a commercial  
fishing boat
44
Fisheries Regulation 1995 85 Contravened a condition of an authority 83
Fisheries Regulation 1995 86 Contravened a fisheries provision 66
Source: Queensland prosecution and sentencing data June 1999–2004; n=2,544
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Characteristics of defendants
The Northern Territory data included unique offender identification numbers and 
demographic information such as the defendant’s gender and Indigenous status. The unique 
identifier facilitates the measurement of multiple offending as well as the descriptive analysis 
of fisheries crime offenders. In the Northern Territory data, the 448 charges recorded were 
attributable to 211 individual defendants in 293 individual offence episodes. Offence 
episodes are measured on a daily basis, so that multiple offences charged on the same day 
are coded as one daily episode. On average a single episode was made up of two offences, 
however one defendant was charged with as many as 12 offences on the same day. 
Defendants with two or more episodes of offending can be classified as multiple or recidivist 
offenders. Analysis indicates that this was the case for only 21 percent of the 211 offenders 
in the Northern Territory. Of these recidivist offenders, the average number of episodes was 
three (minimum two and maximum six). The remaining 167 (79%) offenders had only one 
recorded offence episode.
Descriptive analysis by gender and Indigenous status indicates that:
the majority of offenders were non-Indigenous males (n=167, 79%)
less than one in ten offenders were Indigenous males (n=13, 6%)
a small number of offenders were female (n=9, 4%) and no female offender was 
identified as Indigenous
there were 22 (10%) offenders where either gender or Indigenous status were unknown
there was no difference in the level of multiple offending by either gender or Indigenous 
status
the majority of judicial orders handed down were fines or restitution orders, regardless  
of gender or Indigenous status.
Hot spots
In the jurisdictions examined, where locations were identified, there were ‘hot spots’ of 
detected illegal activity, in that more charges were laid for activity at these locations. This 
could be the result of more surveillance or the targeting of particular areas. The information 
has to be interpreted cautiously given that the amount of missing data, and incomplete or 
vague location references.
In the case of the Northern Territory, most of the offences occurred in and around Darwin 
(see Table 15). There were also a large number of charges laid for illegal activity in the waters 
of the Gulf of Carpentaria. Figure 14 maps the number of charges by location, for 1999–2004.
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Table 15: Northern Territory, charges by recorded offence location,  
1999–2004
Offence location
Total number 
of charges Number of charges by year
Darwin/Darwin Harbour/Darwin 
River/Middle Arm Darwin Harbour
83 1 (1997); 25 (1998); 9 (1999); 5 (2000);  
14 (2001); 10 (2002); 19 (2003) 
Gulf of Carpentaria/near Limmen 
River/in Limmen River/unnamed 
tidal creek in Gulf of Carpentaria/
Jalma Bay/AFZ, Timor Box
63 11 (1998); 7 (1999); 18 (2000); 6 (2001);  
10 (2003); 11 (2004)
Blue Mud Bay 23 1 (1998); 4 (2000); 13 (2001); 4 (2003);  
1 (2004)
Roper River/Port Roper 15 2 (1999); 1 (2000); 4 (2002); 8 (2003)
Finniss River 13 6 (1998); 6 (1999); 1 (2002) 
McArthur River 13 3 (1997); 3 (1998); 1 (1999); 1 (2000); 1 (2001); 
4 (2002)
Numbulwar/Rose River Numbulwar 13 7 (1997); 1 (1999); 5 (2002)
Daly River/Daly River Crossing 11 4 (1999); 1 (2000); 2 (2001); 4 (2002)
Note: with a number of charges prosecuted in 1999–2004, charges were laid in earlier years and offences dating back 
to 1997 are included
Source: AIC, Northern Territory prosecutions and sentencing data 1999–2004 [computer file]; n=448
Figure 14: Northern Territory, charges by recorded offence location, 
1999–2004 (number)
Source: AIC, Northern Territory prosecutions and sentencing data 1999–2004 [computer file]; n=448
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In Queensland, as with the Northern Territory, the greatest number of charges were in the 
Gulf of Carpentaria (see Table 16 and Figure 15), closely followed by the Coral Sea area 
around Cooktown and Swains Reef. The inland lakes of Coolmundi Dam/Lake and Lake 
Leslie/Leslie Dam were also recorded as having a considerable number of charges. 
Unfortunately there was insufficient explanation of the charges linked to Harbourside 
Coldstore Cairns, with the offences receiving in excess of $500,000 in fines.
Table 16: Queensland, charges by recorded offence location,  
May 1999 – December 2004
Offence location
Total number 
of charges Number of charges by year
Gulf of Carpentaria/Karumba and 
surrounds
105 1 (1999); 14 (2000); 23 (2001); 27 (2002);  
14 (2003); 26 (2004)
Coral Sea/Swains Reef/Cooktown 97 7 (2000); 22 (2001); 58 (2002); 8 (2003);  
2 (2004) 
Bustard Head/inside Bustard Head 
enclosure
92 22 (1999); 23 (2000); 39 (2001); 6 (2002);  
2 (2003); 
Harbourside Coldstore, Cairns 62 21 (2002); 41 (2003);
Coolmundi Dam/via, near 
Inglewood/Lake Coolmundi
61 20 (2001); 24 (2002); 9 (2002); 5 (2003);  
3 (2004)
Hervey Bay Scallop Replenishment 
area
50 21(2000); 23 (2001); 2 (2002); 1 (2003);  
3 (2004)
Lake Leslie/near Warwick/ 
Leslie Dam
50 25 (2001); 22 (2002); 3 (2003); 
Port Douglas/Dickson Inlet near 
Port Douglas
42 2 (2001); 3 (2002); 21 (2003); 16 (2004)
Source: Queensland prosecutions and sentencing data May 1999 – December 2004. n=2,319
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Figure 15: Queensland, charges by recorded offence location,  
May 1999 – December 2004 (number)
Source: Queensland prosecutions and sentencing data May 1999 – December 2004; n=2,319
Breach of permit was the most common offence type for AFMA’s Eastern Tuna Billfish 
Fishery which was the fishery with the greatest number of offences (45; Table 17). While the 
AFMA data noted detailed information regarding the nature of the offence, specific offence 
locations were not provided.
Table 17: AFMA, charges by recorded offence location, 2000–04
Fishery location Number of offences
Eastern Tuna Billfish Fishery 45
Northern Prawn Fishery 22
South-East Fishery 22
Gillnett, hook & trap 15
Southern Shark Fishery 15
Source: AIC, AFMA prosecutions and sentencing data 2000–04 [computer file]; n=152
Queensland
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replenishment area
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Inside Bustard Head enclosure
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Table 18 and Figure 16 show the most common Victorian locations for charges during 
2000–04. The vast majority of charges were for offences in and around Port Phillip Bay,  
and most of them related to abalone poaching.
Table 18: Victoria, charges by recorded offence location, 2000–04
Fishery location
Total number 
of charges
Number of  
charges by year
At/near Williamstown/Shelley Beach near 
Williamstown/Jawbone Marine Sanctuary at 
Williamstown/near Battery Road in Williamstown/
near Gloucester Road Reserve in Williamstown/on 
Port Phillip Bay near Williamstown
341 80 (2001); 49 (2002);  
118 (2003); 94 (2004)
Altona/Altona North/Altona Foreshore/Seaholme/
Seaholme Foreshore/Seaholme/near Seaholme/in 
Altona/Point Cook near Altona/on the Esplanade/
foreshore at Altona
312 66 (2000); 55 (2002);  
108 (2003); 83 (2004) 
Black Rock/Black Rock Boat Ramp/at Black 
Rock/Black Rock near Barwon Heads/Ricketts 
Point in Black Rock/Half Moon Bay near Black 
Rock
197 57 (2000); 12 (2001);  
75 (2003); 53 (2004)
Near/at Flinders 215 23 (2000);49 (2001);  
133 (2002); 10 (2004) 
Near Port Fairy/Griffith Island, Port Fairy 175 39 (2000); 49 (2002);  
86 (2003); 1 (2004)
At/near Cape Schanck 170 22 (2000); 75 (2001); 73 (2002)
At Mornington/Marina Cove near Mornington 
Peninsula/Gunnamatta near Mornington Peninsula 
National Park/on Nepean Highway near 
Mornington
148 20 (2001); 42 (2002);  
38 (2003); 48 (2004)
Phillip Island/near Phillip Island/Cowries Beach 
Phillip island/near Summerlands on Phillip Island
107 42 (2001); 15 (2002);  
32 (2003); 18 (2004)
Rye/Rye Back Beach 72 34 (2001; 38 (2002); 
At/near/in Warnambool/Vickers Reef near 
Warnambool/Warnambool Breakwater
69 14 (2001); 18 (2002);  
24 (2003); 13 (2004)
Beaumaris/near Beaumaris/on Port Phillip Bay 
near Beaumaris/Ricketts Point
59 13 (2002); 35 (2003); 11 (2004)
Source: AIC, Victorian prosecutions and sentencing data 2000–04 [computer file]; n=5,696
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Figure 16: Victoria, charges by recorded offence location, 2000–04 
(number)
Source: AIC, Victorian prosecutions and sentencing data 2000–04 [computer file]; n=5,696
Time between offence and court hearing
Victoria was the only jurisdiction to provide separate data for each year. The average  
time between the date of an offence and the date of a court hearing was 159 days, or 
approximately 23 weeks. Figure 17 sets out the average number of days each year, with 
2002 showing the longest average time between the offence date and court appearance 
(178 days, or 25 weeks). There was a difference of 141 days (20 weeks) during 2000.
M E L B O U R N E
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Figure 17: Victoria, average number of days between offence date and 
court hearing, 2000–04
Source: AIC, Victorian prosecutions and sentencing data 2000–04 [computer file] n=5,696
Figure 18 shows the average number of days between offence date and court hearing, for 
1999–2004, for Queensland, Northern Territory and Victoria. The Northern Territory recorded 
the highest average number of days; 376 days between an offence and court date. Victoria 
had the lowest average number of days; 159 days between offence date and court hearing.
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Figure 18: Queensland, Northern Territory and Victoria, average  
number of days between offence date and court date/ 
hearing, 1999–2004
Note: the Northern Territory data recorded court dates while Queensland and Victoria recorded court hearing
Source: AIC, Queensland, Northern Territory and Victoria prosecution and sentencing data 1999–2004 [computer file]; 
n=762 
Convictions
Figure 19 shows that, in Queensland, of the total number of cases where the plea was 
recorded, the majority of defendants (72%) pleaded guilty, either in person or in writing.  
With five percent of the charges, a not guilty plea was entered, and 23 percent were  
dealt with ex parte. In cases where the plea was recorded, a slightly higher proportion  
of recreational fishers (61%) than commercial fishers (57%) pleaded guilty.
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Figure 19: Queensland, plea details by charges, 1999–2004 (percent)
Source: Queensland prosecution and sentencing data June 1999–2004; n=2,544
Court outcomes
Figure 20 shows outcomes by charges for 1999–2004 for the Northern Territory with  
66 percent of charges resulting in a fine or restitution order, four percent resulted in  
a community corrections or other order, and one percent resulted in imprisonment.  
Nearly one third (29%) of charges were withdrawn.
Nearly all charges in Queensland were recorded as resulting in a fine (99%; n=2,412). 
Information on fine amounts handed down in Queensland for the period 1999–2004 is 
presented in Figure 21. The average fine was $1,312 with a maximum of $30,000. Over  
half the charges (51%) resulted in fines of up to $500, 21 percent resulted in fines of over 
$500 and up to $1,000, 24 percent resulted in fines of over $1,000 and up to $5,000,  
with four percent resulting in fines over $5,000.
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Figure 20: Northern Territory, charge outcomes, 1999–2004 (percent) 
Source: AIC, Northern Territory prosecutions and sentencing data 1999–2004 [computer file]; n=448
Figure 21: Queensland, fine amounts, 1999–2004 (percent) 
Source: AIC, Queensland prosecutions and sentencing data 1999–2004 [computer file]; n=2,383
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Conclusion
The chapter has illustrated how prosecution and court outcome data provide useful 
information on trends, hot spots, repeat offenders, the nature of offences and offenders,  
the time between an offence and court outcome, and court outcomes. Some of the key 
points include:
considerable seasonal variations in when illegal fishing activity is detected
location hot spots where much of the illegal activity is detected
many offenders receive, and offending events result in, multiple charges. For example,  
in Victoria in 2003 there were 1,365 charges, 357 unique offenders and 431 events,  
and in the Northern Territory there were 60 charges 29 offenders and 42 events
a proportion of offenders are repeat offenders, with for example, 21 percent of 
defendants in the Northern Territory committing two or more offending events
the commission of fisheries-related crime is not evenly distributed across the population; 
for example, in the Northern Territory 79 percent of defendants were non-Indigenous 
males
few defendants plead not guilty, with for example, only 5 percent of defendants in 
Queensland making this plea
the majority of matters result in a fine; for example in the Northern Territory 66 percent  
of charges resulted in a fine or a restitution order; in Queensland 51 percent of fines  
were on average less than or equal to $500.
The data on prosecutions and court outcomes confirms stakeholder perceptions of court 
outcomes. There were very few serious penalties recorded. The reasons for this could 
include the nature of the offences, many of which seemed minor in nature, but could also 
relate to the lack of experience and knowledge of fisheries within the criminal justice system. 
Dealing with fisheries matters is only likely to be a very small proportion of the work 
undertaken by prosecutors and magistrates, except perhaps in towns or regions with  
a significant fishery or fisheries industry. The volume of charges prosecuted in courts is  
only one measure of detected illegal activity; it does not necessarily indicate whether more 
serious crime is being detected. To properly investigate whether this is the case would 
involve consistent and routine recording of incidents or episodes, offence details including 
the most serious charge and subsequent court disposition.
The consistent recording of core data items across jurisdictions would improve monitoring  
of illegal activity and the outcomes of detection, as well as improve targeting of hot spots 
and offenders. For example, it would have been very useful to have consistent recording  
of main offence types by species of fish in the data, to enable analysis of detected activity  
in vulnerable species. Such data could also inform evaluations or the ongoing impact of 
legislative reform or changes in operational practice and court process.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Ways forward
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Fisheries officers who participated in the national survey advocated a range of strategies to 
improve their capacity and level of effectiveness to address organised criminal activity, and 
echoed themes that emerged from the stakeholder consultations. These included: 
the use of informants (covert investigations/specialist investigations)
improved legislation/powers
more training
specialist units
better communication, for example, from field to base
usage of liaison officers
increased resources, including staff
better, coordinated intelligence and more sharing of intelligence.
A New South Wales fisheries officer made this comment in the national survey:
[There is the need for a] greater emphasis on detection through more fisheries 
officers stationed at locations where high value low volume fisheries are 
located (i.e. New South Wales south coast) and the employment of 
intelligence and investigative fisheries officers to target the highly organised 
players. General duties district fisheries officers have 23 different fishery 
programs that place work and time constraints upon those officers. The 
element of organised syndicates that are involved in criminal activities are 
extremely counter surveillance conscious and require a great deal of time, 
resources and expertise to successfully detect and apprehend. Further, a 
closer working relationship needs to be improved between New South Wales 
Water Police units and Fisheries investigation units so that information sharing 
is taking place (Anonymous respondent to the AIC national survey of fisheries 
officers 2005).
Fisheries officers in the national survey identified interagency cooperation, legislative reform 
and powers afforded fisheries officers as equally important factors to enhance compliance 
and police methods/powers deal with organised criminal activity (Table 19). Specialist 
officers, such as forensic accountants, and the secondment of either fisheries or police 
officers were viewed as less important. Fisheries officers in Queensland and the Northern 
Territory were more likely than officers in other jurisdictions to nominate powers for fisheries 
officers, while AFMA officers were more likely to select the availability of forensic accountants 
and other specialist services. South Australian and Australian Capital Territory officers were 
more likely than other officers to nominate cooperation between agencies. Secondment, 
either of fisheries officers or of police, was most likely to be nominated by AFMA and 
Northern Territory officers. How these improvement can be delivered is discussed in  
this chapter.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Table 19: Rating of strategies to enhance compliance/police methods 
and/or powers to deal with organised criminal activity (percent)
Ways to enhance compliance/ 
police methods and/or powers
Very high                                  Very low
1 2 3 4 5
Cooperation between agencies 60 34 5 1 1
Legislation 60 32 8 0 0
Powers for fisheries officers 60 32 7 1 1
Availability of forensic accountants and other 
specialist services
47 36 14 3 0
Secondment of fisheries officers to police 
departments
26 42 20 9 3
Secondment of police to fisheries departments 24 40 24 8 4
Note: Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding
Source: AIC National Survey of Fisheries Officers 2005 [computer file] weighted data, n=567
Legislation
In his report, Palmer (2004) recommended changes to regulations and legislation in  
New South Wales, some of which may also apply to other jurisdictions: 
reviewing the maximum penalties
the use of court order provisions
documentation for all commercially stored fish
temporary closure of premises found in possession of illegally caught/undocumented fish
expansion of confiscation of assets legislation
new Customs legislation to circumvent exportation of illegal product via international air 
travel baggage
clarification of ownership of fish found on board a vessel
reduction in recreational bag limits
revision of the system of reward payments to increase incentive to report illegal fishing 
validating the returns of fish receivers.
An examination of fisheries legislation across Australia suggests that it is, or is perceived to 
be, too complicated in its construction and content. It is clear from the nature and range of 
legislation on fisheries-related offences that such legislation is designed primarily to regulate 
the fishing industry. In legislation, there is a danger that offences have become amalgamated 
and the distinction between minor infringements such as licence breaches on the one hand, 
and major infringements such as illegal catching or possessing of species, on the other, may 
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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become less distinct. A perception may subsequently be created within the fishing industry 
that some offences are not more serious than others.
Further simplification and/or uniformity in legislation could involve the following:
No division between recreational and commercial fishers in terms of the commission  
of offences. If the former are in possession of, or catch, more than the designated 
recreational quota they could be deemed to be commercial fishers with an onus to  
prove otherwise.
No distinction made in legislation between the taking of fish and the possession of fish. 
In either case the quantity or size of the fish should be the issue. Whether the fisher 
caught, or simply had, the fish in question in his/her possession, would be immaterial.  
In addition, a focus placed upon the value of fish rather than the actual number of fish, 
with a penalty regime to reflect that value, may be more effective than the imposition  
of a fine limited by the number of fish found.
An offence of trafficking (following Victoria’s example) introduced into all states and 
territories (already in progress in some jurisdictions). The offence would ideally extend  
to those areas, such as processing plants, wholesalers and retailers, through which,  
or to whom, such fish are dispatched.
There seems to be little attempt in some jurisdictions to distinguish between the perceived 
or actual seriousness of offences in terms of the nature or severity of the penalty. In addition, 
there is no financial penalty regime applied universally in all states and territories. South 
Australia and Western Australia have systems of fines and expiation fees, while the Northern 
Territory has both penalty units and fines. The remaining states have penalty units although 
Tasmania further grades its penalties into three categories (1, 2 and 3) with grade 3 penalties 
relating in turn to two levels of offence.
It is noteworthy that jurisdictions provide for the suspension, revocation or adjustment of 
licences. For example, Victoria provides (Fisheries Act 1995) for the prohibition of a person 
from being on boats or in certain places and may suspend a licence for a period of up to  
12 months and can cancel a person’s entitlement to be allocated an individual quota or 
cancel the access licence (the latter two in relation to a third and subsequent offence, 
respectively. However, there needs to be provision in all legislation for an automatic ban  
from certain types of fishing activity, or fishing areas, or loss or adjustment of licences, for  
a person convicted of various offences. Arguably, the loss or adjustment of a licence should 
be considered in relation to first offences. Restrictions on fishing, or the inability to fish at all, 
are more likely to act as a disincentive than the prospect of a fine and/or imprisonment.
•
•
•
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Law enforcement and compliance
It should be noted that most people are deterred not by the sentence they might receive but 
by the prospect of being caught. The actual or perceived low probability of detection and 
prosecution, combined with the relatively low penalties imposed, (in contrast to the high 
maximum penalties provided for in the legislation), may encourage some in the fishing 
industry to conclude that the potential economic benefits of overfishing or illegal fishing 
outweigh the risk of detection and penalty.
Australia has an extensive coastline and policing it requires targeted use of resources by 
each jurisdiction. As both theft and illegal marketing of fish are carried out by a small group 
of offenders, Palmer (2004) argued for targeted approaches:
… genuine opportunities, through sensible, properly targeted legislative 
reform, educational programs, culturally based equitable allocations and 
fisheries enforcement, to markedly reduce illegal activity and improve 
compliance levels (Palmer 2004: 6).
Budgetary constraints are likely to limit expansion of fisheries agencies and, instead, an 
intelligence-led policing strategy is required. This includes targeting resources upon more 
popular fishing areas, known recidivist offenders, vulnerable areas of the fishing industry’s 
commodity chain (such as harvesting, processing, distribution and/or sale); fine tuning 
training needs; facilitating the finalisation of intra-jurisdictional and inter-jurisdictional agency 
agreements; ensuring a supportive occupational health and safety environment; use and 
development of specialist skills (for example, forensic accountants); and being open to new 
and emerging technological advances (for example, electronic identification systems/
docketing systems).
Information and intelligence
Involving the community in reported suspected illegal fishing can, it seems, provide 
invaluable information. In Victoria a 40 percent increase in prosecutions and a 30 percent 
increase in penalty infringement notices has been attributed to a range of factors, including 
additional fisheries compliance resources, targeted intelligence driven investigations and 
tactical patrols, and the introduction of a 24/7 fisheries offence reporting telephone line 
(VDPI 2005).
There is no systematic collection of intelligence across jurisdictions, despite improvements in 
secure data holdings at a jurisdictional level. This means that there is no national monitoring 
of the nature and extent of the problem or of the detection and prosecution of offences, or 
monitoring of court outcomes.
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While four jurisdictions were asked to provide similar information on prosecutions and court 
outcomes, the way in which this was done differed by jurisdiction. The extent of information 
varied, as did the quality. Stage 1 of the project included a review of data holdings, which 
found weaknesses inherent in the systems, for example, the reporting systems for illegal, 
unregulated and unreported fishing. The lack of a uniform database for recording fishing 
offences limits the ability of agencies to track displacement and/or recidivism activities.  
A uniform database would also provide a rich source of material to map these activities  
in contiguous states generally and border areas specifically.
The project data did enable some useful analysis of, for example, seasonal variations  
and offence locations. There were, however, limitations to the analysis due to missing data.  
If ongoing and collaborative analysis is to be undertaken, it will be necessary for fisheries 
officers to provide full and accurate descriptions of offences and defendants. Jurisdictions 
need an opportunity to discuss the range of data to be included, as well as uniform 
descriptions. 
Operational collaboration
Because of the risk of growing involvement of organised crime activity in Australia’s fishing 
industry, increased cooperation should be fostered between relevant agencies to ensure  
a more coordinated and targeted use of resources. The collaboration of agencies within  
a jurisdiction is generally considered effective by fisheries officers. However, at the multi-
jurisdictional level when other agencies are involved, 50 percent of fisheries officers 
perceived the collaboration to be either ineffective or very ineffective. However, it could  
be argued that a range of interagency/inter-jurisdictional cooperative arrangements is 
paramount, given the borderless nature of this crime.
As an operational form of collaboration, the strategic use of multi-agency and multi-skilled 
taskforces to tackle serious and organised criminal activity could ensure effective and 
efficient use of resources. It might be useful to institute a permanent taskforce within each 
jurisdiction staffed by a core group of agencies. Other agencies could be seconded, as the 
need arose. The ‘flying squad’ model advocated by Palmer (2004) would involve a specialist 
mobile team conducting covert operations, building knowledge of recidivist offenders, and 
undertaking specialised training in intelligence-related activities.
The benefits of long term or permanent task forces, in some cases set up between two 
countries under a bilateral arrangement and involving a range of stakeholders, have been 
demonstrated here and overseas. For example, in the bilateral arrangement between 
Canada and the United States over the protection of Lake Erie, Indigenous tribal groups  
are included in an advisory committee (Great Lakes Fishery Commission 2003). The 2005 
0
Victorian operation, Operation Black Ice, demonstrated the success of a multi-agency 
approach which included the involvement of Fisheries Victoria, Victoria Police, Centrelink, 
the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Workcover Authority and the Australian 
Tax Office. The arrest in 2005 of 36 people involved in illegal abalone activity was the result 
of planning and surveillance over a 12 month period (VDPI 2005). Another example has 
been a reduction of organised crime activity in the abalone sector through long term multi-
agency operations in South Africa (Itano 2003).
Based on the national survey of fisheries officers, it would seem that differing priorities 
across agencies and jurisdictions are a major impediment to operational collaboration, along 
with limited resources and legislative differences. It is not within the scope of this project to 
identify the most effective policy responses that would foster collaboration and cooperation. 
However, any such initiatives should be mindful of stakeholder perceptions that there are 
very real barriers that need to be overcome to achieve success.
Specialist skills and training
Because of the costs associated with specialist expertise, there may be some benefit in 
exploring the possibility of forensic accountants being made available for regular cross-
jurisdictional investigations. These issues come back to the importance of developing and 
maintaining a high level of inter-jurisdictional cooperation which could result in the ready 
deployment of specialist services.
Fisheries agencies in South Africa, Canada and New Zealand have taken advantage of 
specialist police equipment and officers trained in covert activities for one off or ongoing 
assistance in operations (Johns & le May 2001). Increased cooperation between fisheries 
and police agencies is assumed to result in a wide range of benefits such as improved 
morale; greater efficiency, including more targeted use of resources; a better educated 
workforce; and an improved success rate in dealing with organised crime activity in the 
fishing industry.
The budget of the Ministry of Fisheries in New Zealand was increased to allow for the 
employment of extra staff, including the establishment of a special tactics team, specialist 
surveillance equipment and five extra vehicles. A multi-agency approach to dealing with 
fisheries-related organised crime was implemented between the Ministry of Fisheries, the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Customs and the Aviation Security Service. These 
initiatives were introduced to deal more effectively with COC and OMCG activity, particularly 
in New Zealand’s abalone fishery (New Zealand. Ministry of Fisheries 2005).
To help fisheries staff obtain specialist skills, the Victorian Department of Primary Industries 
sought the assistance of Victoria Police. Specifically, fisheries officers are seconded to 
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relevant Victoria Police departments: six weeks working with Crime Department detectives; 
three weeks with the Tactical Response Squad; and two weeks with a crime investigation 
unit. Skills are gained in such areas as ‘investigative methods, investigation, planning skills, 
interview skills, brief preparation, electronic surveillance methods and an improved 
understanding of the confiscation regime’ (Arnold 2005). To encourage interagency 
cooperation, both agencies signed a Memorandum of Understanding, as well as a ‘set  
of operating protocols for responding to jobs’ (Arnold 2005).
In Queensland, six special investigators are located in Cairns, Townsville, Mackay, Brisbane, 
the Gold Coast and Hervey Bay, to enhance capacity to undertake complex investigations  
of fisheries infringements such as quota-related fraud offences. In addition, there are four 
specialist officers who can undertake covert or rapid response enforcement activities around 
the state (Queensland. Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries 2005).
Palmer (2004) emphasised improvements in training and changes to the operational focus  
of compliance officers including:
more effective and better focused training programs
improved operational methodologies, including the introduction and inculcation of an 
effective intelligence capacity, and analysis into operational targeting and planning
a revised award and industrial framework to support improved operational practices
less prescriptive work profiles, combined with the development of agreed outcomes 
based charters of performance
an improved emphasis on quality over quantity
increased operational flexibility
corresponding opportunity for the exercise of individual discretion
an overall improvement in the organisation’s investigative skill profile.
If there is to be a change in operational focus and in recognition of the likelihood that 
fisheries officers may be required to confront dangerous offenders, then appropriate 
measures need to be taken to reduce the risk to officers. While the survey found that nearly 
50 percent of officers believed their current occupational health and safety procedures 
provided a safe environment for compliance officers in dealing with organised crime, 
approximately one-third of respondents believed they did not. Officers suggested various 
measures to improve their safety including batons, capsicum sprays, guns, vests, training, 
self defence, fitness, and communications (phones – mobile or satellite).
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Prosecution and court outcomes
Taking advantage of technological advances, South Australia and Western Australia have 
developed a new fisheries prosecution system, which is aimed at improving accountability 
and the tracking of information and intelligence (South Australia. Department of Primary 
Industry and Resources 2005). This initiative will presumably lead to better prepared briefs 
for prosecution.
Specialist courts are one way that relevant expertise could be developed and promoted  
in the justice system to successfully prosecute more serious forms of criminal activity in  
the fishing sector. The introduction of environmental courts in South Africa was primarily  
to process criminal activity in the abalone sector. Another aspect of South Africa’s 
environmental court is the education and training of fisheries officers, police officers, 
investigating officers, compliance officers, as well as state advocates, and prosecutors. 
Training manuals have also been developed for use by inspectors, investigators and 
prosecutors, based on the activities of the environmental courts (South Africa. Department 
of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2003).
In Australia there are environmental courts in several jurisdictions and it would be worthwhile 
investigating whether cases of fisheries crime or illegal activity are considered in them. 
Stakeholder consultations suggested not, but more investigation is required to ascertain  
if and why this is the case.
Education
Palmer (2004) has argued that
… there is a need to fundamentally change the prevailing ‘Australian’ fishing 
culture, not only of the fishing community, but also of the judiciary, the 
government and the general public. In particular, many people within the 
industry expressed serious concern at the apparent lack of judicial recognition 
of the environmental impact and direct threat to the resource, caused by 
many forms of illegal harvesting and black marketing of fish … and an 
underestimation of the seriousness of the offences by the judiciary when 
determining penalties (Palmer 2004: 5).
Educational and training initiatives may be appropriate for a broad range of stakeholders 
including the general public, the fishing community, fisheries officers/agencies and police 
officers/agencies. While it is unrealistic to expect that broad based educational strategies  
will bring about a higher level of compliance, it could create a heightened awareness of the 
impact of criminal activity and the vulnerability of Australian fish stocks to over- and illegal 
exploitation.
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Conclusion
Overall, the research found that illegal activity in the fishing industry is widespread in both the 
commercial and recreational sectors. The consultations with stakeholders and the national 
survey of fisheries officers shows that much of this activity is low level, and that much of the 
work undertaken by fisheries officers is not directly concerned with criminal activity. This is 
not to say it is unimportant. Officers were clearly concerned about changes to their working 
environment, and the adequacy of a range of measures to effectively deal with criminal 
activity, particularly where it involves established criminal networks. A number of jurisdictions 
were concerned about the involvement of OMCGs or Chinese organised crime groups.  
For example, in Western Australia an OMCG was said to have been involved in the theft  
of pearls; in the Northern Territory OMCGs had purchased fishing licences; and in South 
Australia, enforcement stakeholders believed that an OMCG had been involved in the illegal 
abalone trade.
Consultations revealed that stakeholders were concerned about the potential vulnerability of 
key species to organised criminal activity – abalone, mud crab, coral, reef, and fin fish, rock 
lobster and shark fin. They also stressed what can be characterised as the endemic nature, 
Australia-wide, of pseudo-recreational fishing. Pseudo-recreational fishing is fishing activity 
carried out under the guise of recreational fishing, but using commercial equipment and/or 
harvesting commercial quantities. There are two major areas of concern. One is organised 
crime activity, with sophisticated trading networks, including underground banking. The 
other is seemingly less organised crime activity, but one that may have a detrimental impact 
on fish stock levels, for example, barramundi, KGW, abalone, rock lobster or prawns.
This study has revealed differences and some similarities across the jurisdictions in how  
they currently respond to illegal activity with respect to a range of indicators in the Terms  
of Reference. These include
differing penalty regimes
the use of summary versus indictable offences
the degree of financial punishment
the ability to confiscate assets or the proceeds of crime
the imposition and/or severity of imprisonment. 
Other differences and similarities include the use by fisheries officers of items such as 
capsicum spray or protective vests, the ability to search and make an arrest, and the  
degree of cooperation and information exchange with relevant government agencies.
It seems that the legislative framework in Australia is overly complicated. The legislative 
review notes that the statutes attempt to be all encompassing, in containing all possible 
•
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infractions that a fisher might commit. As a result, the distinction between minor 
infringements and the illegal catching or possessing of species may become less distinct. 
Stakeholder consultations highlighted individual approaches by jurisdictions in the nature 
and extent of their legislation. This is supported by the legislative review which found that 
each jurisdiction operates as a self contained unit. The lack of even a general consistency  
of approach across jurisdictions may lead to displacement of organised crime activity as 
organised crime groups exploit differences in relation to species, licensing requirements, 
quotas, compliance regimes and enforcement capacity.
Arguably, people become fisheries officers to pursue a career in fisheries conservation and 
management. They also have a regulatory enforcement role under the Acts. However, the 
wide range of regulatory activities they are required to undertake in an environment of 
resource constraints may undermine their enforcement capacity, particularly given that the 
total number of fisheries officers in Australia is less than 600. That capacity is likely to be 
further diminished if they are required to police suspected organised crime activity. It might 
not have been anticipated that that enforcement role would entail involvement in curtailing 
organised crime activity. It is likely that the training of fisheries officers does not routinely 
prepare them for the intricacies or potential danger surrounding the investigation of 
organised criminal involvement in the fishing industry. In addition, the issuing of protective 
equipment, for example, capsicum spray or stab/bulletproof vests, varies across 
jurisdictions. This is further complicated by the differing approaches to enforcement taken  
by the jurisdictions. For example, in the Northern Territory and Tasmania, enforcement is 
undertaken by the police services. Moreover, the powers of arrest, search, entry and seizure 
accorded to fisheries officers vary between jurisdictions.
Several stakeholders advocated a process that would ensure a strategic approach to assess 
risk and to assign some measure of priority to the full range of illegal and criminal activities 
as part of the routine business of fisheries management and compliance. It is worth 
considering that the environmental damage of widespread minor infractions may be greater 
than the potential risk and impact of less frequent and less common organised criminal 
activity. Recognising that there is a finite capacity to respond to illegal activity and to 
minimise the harms it causes, various models were proposed in the literature and by 
stakeholders to create a cost effective approach to the less frequent but potentially more 
serious forms of organised criminal activity that exploits resources or is facilitated within the 
industry. Common themes highlighted during the consultations with all jurisdictions included 
the need for alternative or enhanced management/compliance strategies, for example, the 
need for forensic accountants and other types of staff, better links to police and other 
facilities, such as boats, which would help to tackle organised criminal activity. Better 
contact with police was linked to a greater capacity within state fisheries agencies for 
intelligence gathering, or to run investigations.
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There are a range of measures, viewed as important by fisheries officers who responded  
to the national survey, that would be instrumental in detecting and dealing with organised 
criminal activity, including:
legislative changes, in the definition of offences, the extent and availability of powers 
granted to fisheries officers, and penalty regimes
information and intelligence recording, sharing, collation and analysis
operational collaboration, including taskforces and the use of specialist services
specialist skills and training for fisheries officers.
The analysis of prosecution and court outcome data highlighted the potential use of such 
data. It also confirmed stakeholder perceptions that minor matters mostly reach the courts 
and very few serious penalties are meted out for fisheries crime. A contributing factor may 
be the way that courts deal with offences and offenders that stakeholders regard as serious. 
The prevailing view in the community and built into legislation, that much noncompliance  
in the fishing industry is of a minor nature or due to error, no doubt works against more 
serious matters being dealt with in the court process in a fashion that is commensurate with 
fisheries officers’ perceptions of their seriousness. From the literature and in stakeholder 
consultations, several initiatives emerged that would assist in addressing this issue including:
specialist courts
educational strategies for a range of stakeholders, including the general community.
These are major commitments which would need considerable support from key sectors. 
Similarly, ameliorating widespread concerns about the vulnerability of Australia’s fishing to 
organised criminal activity involves adopting measures and implementing reforms that may 
take some time and resources to achieve. Nevertheless, only with stakeholder and cross 
jurisdictional support will there be fisheries management arrangements, fisheries legislation 
and regime of penalties, policing methods and powers, court processes, cooperative 
arrangements and public support that can effectively prevent and stop organised criminal 
activity. At a national level, several strategic objectives of the Australian Fisheries National 
Compliance Strategy 2004–09 already represent a policy commitment to monitor and 
respond quickly to opportunistic and organised criminal involvement in fisheries, through 
cooperation between stakeholders and across jurisdictions. However, it is too soon to tell 
whether the implementation of the policy will occur on a national scale and whether it will 
have the desired impact on crime in the Australian fishing industry.
•
•
•
•
•
•
Appendix A 
Officers’ powers  
under fisheries legislation
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Note: Legislation was compiled in 2005.
Western Australia
Fish Resources Management Act 1994
Section Powers of fisheries officers Penalty 
180 Police officers to have powers of fisheries officers
181 Naval officers to have powers of fisheries officers in 
dealing with foreign boats
182 Routine inspection
183 Entry onto land
184 Entry and search of non-residential premises in connection 
with offence
185 Entry and search of residential premises in connection  
with offence
186 Entry and search of tents, camps and unauthorized 
structures
187 Warrants
188 Warrants may be granted by telephone etc.
189 Provision of information
190 Production of authorisations etc.
191 Other powers of fisheries officers (including power to 
detain a person while inspecting fish or fishing gear)
191A Additional powers of fisheries officers in relation to cruelty
192 Arrest
193 Seizure
194 Fish may be returned to water etc.
195 Seizure of abandoned etc. fishing gear
196 Person not to interfere with seized property Individual: $10,000;  
body corporate: $20,000
197 Giving of assistance $10,000
198 Fisheries officer to try to minimise damage
199 False or misleading information Individual: $10,000 and 
imprisonment for 1 year; 
body corporate: $20,000
200 Obstruction of fisheries officers Individual: $10,000 and 
imprisonment for 1 year; 
body corporate: $20,000
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Queensland
Fisheries Act 1994
Section Powers of inspectors Penalty 
145 Entry to places
146 Boarding of boats and entry of vehicles
147 Boarding of boat, or entry of vehicle, that is moving  
or about to move
148 Warrants
148A Monitoring warrants for abalone
149 Warrants – applications made other than in person
150 Inspector’s general powers for places, boats and vehicles
151 Power to seize evidence from places etc.
152 Power to seize evidence after boarding a boat or entering 
a vehicle
153 Additional power to seize fisheries resources etc.
154 Seizure of fisheries resources in heap etc.
155 Power to seize explosives etc.
156 Powers in support of seizure
157 Receipt to be given
158 Inspector to allow inspection etc.
159 Inspector may dispose of fisheries resources taken 
unlawfully
170 Power to stop persons 200 penalty units
171 Power to require name and address 200 penalty units
172 Power to require information from certain persons 200 penalty units
173 In respect of a person who is required to have a document 
available for immediate inspection
500 penalty units
In respect of a person who is required to keep a document 200 penalty units
175 False or misleading information 500 penalty units
176 False, misleading or incomplete documents 500 penalty units
181 Consent to entry
182 Obstruction etc. of an inspector 1,000 penalty units
183 Impersonation of inspector 1,000 penalty units
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New South Wales
Fisheries Management Act 1994 
Section Powers of fisheries officers Penalty 
244 Police officers to be fisheries officers
247 Obstructing, impersonating etc. fisheries officers 200 penalty units  
or imprisonment for  
3 months or both
248 Power to board and search boats
249 Power to require gear to be removed from water 50 penalty units
250 Power to enter and search premises
251 Power to detain and search vehicles 50 penalty units
252 Entry into waters, and along banks etc.
253 Entry into and examination of aquaculture farms
254 Entry into residential premises
255 Power to examine fishing gear or other equipment
256 Production of records relating to commercial fishing 
activities and fish receivers
50 penalty units
257 Power to require production of fishing authority 25 penalty units
258 Power to require information 50 penalty units
259 False information 200 penalty units  
or imprisonment for  
3 months, or both
260 Issue of search warrants
261 Hot pursuit
262 Power of arrest
263 Care to be taken
264 Seizure of things (other than boats and motor vehicles) 
connected with fisheries offence
265 Seizure of boats and motor vehicles
266 Seizure of fishing gear and other things (other than boats, 
motor vehicles or fish)
267 Seizure of fish
268 Reasonable cause for seizure a bar to action
272 Forfeiture of things (other than boats and motor vehicles) 
where no relevant offence proceedings taken
274 Disposal of perishable things
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Victoria
Fisheries Act 1995
Section Power of authorised officers Penalty if applicable
101A Authorised officer (a person appointed as an authorised 
officer under the Conservation, Forests and Lands Act 1987 
for the purposes of this Act) may execute warrant to arrest
101B Powers of arrest
101C Power to arrest person in breach of an order
101D Arrest on reasonable grounds not to be taken to be 
unlawful
101E Power to arrest person released on bail
101F Power to arrest a person against whom a warrant has 
been issued
101G Power to search person for priority species
101H Records of searches
102 Powers of entry and inspection In respect of failure  
to provide a licence or 
permit: 4 penalty units
102A Production of financial records
103 Powers to search dwelling house
104 Provisions relating to the seizure of items
105 Powers of seizure
106 Forfeiture or return of things seized 50 penalty units
106A Magistrates’ Court may extend 90 day period
107 Disposal of live fish or perishable things
108 Offence in relation to seized property 100 penalty units  
or imprisonment for  
6 months or both
108A Retention notices 100 penalty units or  
6 months imprisonment 
or both
109 Power to require name and address 20 penalty units
110 Hot pursuit of person and boats beyond Victorian waters
110A Authorised officers do not commit offences in certain 
circumstances
111 Offences with respect to authorised officers 20 penalty units
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Australian Capital Territory
Fisheries Act 2000
Section Power of conservation officers Penalty 
54 Entry to places
55 Consent to entry
56 Routine inspection of business premises
57 Warrants to enter
58 Warrants – application made other than in person
59 Powers on entry with consent
60 Powers on entry for routine inspection of business 
premises
61 Powers on entry under a warrant 50 penalty units
63 Entry into waters, and along banks etc.
64 Requirement to give name etc. 5 penalty units
65 Power to require gear to be removed from water 50 penalty units
66 Seizure of fish etc.
67 Seizure and destruction of noxious fish
68 Procedure after thing seized
Tasmania*
Living Marine Resources Management Act 1995
Section Power of fisheries officers Penalty 
169 A fisheries officer has the powers and protection of a police 
officer with the rank of constable
171 Naval officer
172 Assistant fisheries officer
173 Minimising damage
174 Entry and inspection of land and premises
175 Search of non-residential premises
176 Search of residential premises
177 Entry and search of train and aircraft
178 Entry into waters
179 Search of place
180 Boarding and searching vessel
181 Stopping vessel or vehicle
182 Securing vessel, vehicle, land and premises
183 Detaining vessel
184 Use of vessel or vehicle
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Living Marine Resources Management Act 1995 continued
Section Power of fisheries officers Penalty 
185 Fisheries officer on board vessel
186 Pursuit of vessel or person
187 Examination of fish
188 Apparatus and equipment
189 Opening and unlocking vessel, door or container
190 Production of things
191 Production of records and documents 20 penalty units
192 Production of authorisation
193 Photographs, sketches, measurements and recordings
194 Examination and inquiry
195 Assistance 
196 Information requirements
197 Application and issue of warrant
198 Urgent situations
199 Arrest
200 Seizure of fish, vessels and other things
201 Seizure of abandoned apparatus and fish
202 Interference with seized property Fine not exceeding  
200 penalty units
203 Offences against fisheries officer Fine not exceeding  
200 penalty units
204 Compliance with requirement, direction or signal Fine not exceeding  
50 penalty units
205 Refusing search Fine not exceeding  
50 penalty units
206 Impersonation of fisheries officer Fine not exceeding  
50 penalty units
* Enforcement is undertaken by Tasmania Police Marine & Rescue Division
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South Australia
Fisheries Act 1982
Section Powers of fisheries officers Penalty 
28(1) (a) Enter and search and inspect premises, land, waters, boat  
or vehicle
28(1) (b) Seize and retain the fish, boat, vehicle, device, equipment, 
document, record or other thing
28(1) (c) Give any directions to the person in charge of, or any 
person in or on, any premises, land, waters, boat or 
vehicle 
28(1) (d) Require the person to state his or her full name and usual 
place of residence and to produce evidence of his or her 
identity
28(1) (e) Require the person in charge of the boat to give 
information concerning the boat, the boat’s crew  
and any person on board the boat
28(1) (f) Require any person required to hold an authority or to 
have an authority in his or her possession to produce  
the authority
Northern Territory*
Fisheries Act 2004
Section Powers of fisheries officers Penalty 
30 Fisheries officer may question and examine
31 Search
32 General matters relating to powers of Fisheries Officers
33 Powers of seizure
* Enforcement is undertaken by Northern Territory Marine and Fisheries Enforcement Unit
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Commonwealth
Fisheries Management Act 1991
Section Power of officers Penalty 
84 Powers of officers
84A Detention 
84B Searches
84C Customs officers may carry arms in exercise of powers 
under this Act
85 When search warrants can be issued
85A The things that are authorised by a search warrant
85B Availability of assistance and use of force in executing  
a warrant
85C Copy of warrant to be given to occupier etc.
85D Specific powers available to officer executing warrant
85E Use of equipment to examine or process things
85F Use of electronic equipment at premises
85G Compensation for damage to electronic equipment
85H Copies of seized things to be provided
85J Occupier entitled to be present during search
85K Receipts for things seized under warrant
86 Warrants by telephone or other electronic means
87 Power to pursue persons and boats
87A Officers’ powers: FSA boat on high seas after illegally 
fishing in AFZ
87B Officers’ powers: FSA boat illegally fishing on the  
high seas
87C Officers’ powers: FSA boat in Australian waters
87E Limits on exercising certain powers in relation to  
FSA boats
87F Procedures relating to exercise of powers on FSA boat
87H Officers’ powers: boat on high seas without nationality
87J Use of force to exercise powers relating to boat
88 Release of seized property
88A Release of FSA boats being investigation for high seas 
offences
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The Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975
Section Powers of inspectors Penalty 
39S Power to search aircraft and vessels 10 penalty units
39T Powers of inspector in relation to premises 10 penalty units
39U Warrant to enter premises
44 Inspectors ex officio: every member or special member of 
the Australian Federal Police is an inspector
45A Power of inspectors to give directions 10 penalty units
46 Arrest without warrant
46A Power to conduct a frisk search of an arrested person
46B Power to conduct an ordinary search
46D Retention of things that are seized
47 Confiscation and forfeiture
47B Notice requiring vessel, aircraft or article etc. to be 
delivered to inspector or other person
Imprisonment for  
12 months
48 General powers of inspectors
48AA Power of inspector to copy, or take extracts from, 
documents
48AB Power of inspector to seize weapons
48A Limitation on exercise of powers – location
Appendix B 
State and territory penalty regimes
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Note: Penalty regimes were compiled in 2005.
South Australia
Penalties
Division 1 imprisonment A term of imprisonment not exceeding 15 years
Division 1 fine A fine not exceeding $60,000
Division 2 imprisonment A term of imprisonment not exceeding 10 years
Division 2 fine A fine not exceeding $40,000
Division 3 imprisonment A term of imprisonment not exceeding 7 years
Division 3 fine A fine not exceeding $30,000
Division 4 imprisonment A term of imprisonment not exceeding 4 years
Division 4 fine A fine not exceeding $15,000
Division 5 imprisonment A term of imprisonment not exceeding 2 years
Division 5 fine A fine not exceeding $8,000
Division 6 imprisonment A term of imprisonment not exceeding 1 year
Division 6 fine A fine not exceeding $4,000
Division 6 fee An expiation fee of $300
Division 7 imprisonment A term of imprisonment not exceeding 6 months
Division 7 fine A fine not exceeding $2,000
Division 7 fee An expiation fee of $200
Division 8 imprisonment A term of imprisonment not exceeding 3 months
Division 8 fine A fine not exceeding $1,000
Division 8 fee An expiation fee of $150
Division 9 fine A fine not exceeding $500
Division 9 fee An expiation fee of $100
Division 10 fine A fine not exceeding $200
Division 10 fee An expiation fee of $75
Division 11 fine A fine not exceeding $100
Division 11 fee An expiation fee of $50
Division 12 fine A fine not exceeding $50
Division 12 fee An expiation fee of $25
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Tasmania
Penalty levels
Penalty level Penalty regime
Grade 1 penalty A fine not less than 1 penalty unit and not more than 20 penalty units
Grade 2 penalty A fine not less than one penalty unit and not more than 1,000 penalty units for  
a first offence; or
not less than 2 penalty units and not more than 1,000 penalty units for a second 
offence; or
not less than 5 penalty units and not more than 1,000 penalty units for a third  
or subsequent offence
Grade 3 penalty For a level one offence, a fine not less than one penalty unit and not more than 
5 penalty units, for a first offence; or
a fine not less than 2 penalty units and not more than 100 penalty units, for  
a second offence; or
a fine not less than 5 penalty units and not more than 100 penalty units  
or a term of imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, or both, for a third  
or subsequent offence
For a level two offence, a fine not less than 2 penalty units and not more  
than 5,000 penalty units or a term of imprisonment not exceeding 6 months,  
or both, for a first offence; or
a fine not less than 5 penalty units and not more than 5,000 penalty units  
or a term of imprisonment not exceeding 12 months, or both, for a second 
offence; or
a fine not less than 10 penalty units and not more than 5,000 penalty units  
or a term of imprisonment not exceeding 2 years, or both, for a third or 
subsequent offence
Offence levels
Level one offence
Offence which involves less than –
10 rock lobster or giant crabs; or
3 rock lobster pots; or
4 rock lobster rings; or
3 fish traps; or
200 scallops; or
5 shark; or
20 abalone; or
20 kilograms of abalone; or
20 of any other fish or plant species; or
less than 1% of the total number of rock lobster, giant crab, abalone or scallops taken by, or in the 
possession of, the person convicted of the offence if the person was operating under a subsisting 
commercial licence for that species when the offence was committed.
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Offence levels continued
Level two offence
Offence which involves not less than:
10 rock lobster or giant crabs; or
3 rock lobster pots; or
4 rock lobster rings; or
3 fish traps; or
200 scallops; or
5 shark; or
20 abalone; or
20 kilograms of abalone; or
20 of any other fish or plant species; or
not less than 1% of the total number of rock lobster, giant crab, abalone or scallops taken by, or in  
the possession of, the person convicted of the offence if the person was operating under a subsisting 
commercial licence for that species when the offence was committed. 
For any other case
a fine not less than one penalty unit and not more than 5,000 penalty units or a term of imprisonment 
not exceeding 6 months, or both, for a first offence; or
a fine not less than 2 penalty units and not more than 5,000 penalty units or a term of imprisonment 
not exceeding 12 months, or both, for a second offence; or
a fine not less than 5 penalty units and not more than 5,000 penalty units or a term of imprisonment 
not exceeding 2 years, or both, for a third or subsequent offence.
Other jurisdictions
State Fine Penalty unit
Value of penalty  
unit if applicable
Queensland  1 penalty unit = $75
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority  1 penalty unit = $110
Western Australia 
Northern Territory 
Commonwealth  1 penalty unit = $110
New South Wales  1 penalty unit = $110
Victoria  1 penalty unit = $104.81
Australian Capital Territory  1 penalty unit = $100 (individual) 
or $500 (corporation)
Tasmania  1 penalty unit = $100
Appendix C 
National survey of fisheries officers
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The extent of organised criminal  
activity in Australia’s fishing industry
The following survey questionnaire forms part of an ongoing study concerned with organised 
criminal activity in Australia’s fishing industry. The questionnaire addresses questions which 
arose from the preliminary findings of the National Study into Crime in the Australian Fishing 
Industry. These findings have indicated that there is a high propensity for organised crime  
to be operating in the Australian fishing industry. The survey aims to obtain the views of 
fisheries officers to assist in determining whether there is a particular problem in Australian 
fisheries, the scope of the problem and what can be done to address this issue. 
Organised crime in Australia’s fishing industry is defined as being a structured group  
of three or more persons, who work together with the purpose of committing a serious 
offence. The fishing industry is defined as people who are involved in the taking, processing 
or transporting of fish by both licensed and unlicensed operators in the commercial, 
recreational and Indigenous sectors. The survey is interested in the more sophisticated, 
systematic and serious forms of illegal activity, rather than minor regulatory infringements. 
The questionnaire is confidential. The information you provide will be reported only in the 
form of statistical summaries and your individual identity will not be revealed.
Should you have any queries regarding the survey questionnaire, please do not hesitate  
to call the following number during business hours: 02 6260 9248.
The extent of organised criminal activity in Australia’s fishing industry
1. Do you believe that there is organised criminal activity operating within the fishing 
industry of your State/Territory? 
 A lot of criminal activity
 Some criminal activity
 A little criminal activity
 No criminal activity
 Don’t know
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 In your opinion, what proportion of the fishing industry in your work area/district/
region is involved in fishing-related criminal activities?
 0 – 20 per cent
 21 – 40 per cent
 41 – 60 per cent
 61 – 80 per cent
 81 – 100 per cent
 Don’t know
 In your opinion, what proportion of this criminal activity in the fishing industry in 
your work area/district/region is organised criminal activity?
 0 – 5 per cent
 6 – 10 per cent
 11 – 20 per cent
 21 – 30 per cent
 31 – 40 per cent
 More than 41 per cent
 Don’t know
2. Do you believe that the types of criminal activity encountered by fisheries 
enforcement agencies has changed over the past five years?
 Greatly changed
 Changed
 Somewhat changed
 Not changed at all
 Don’t know
3. Do you believe your State/Territory is effective in detecting organised criminal 
activity in the fishing industry?
 Very effective
 Effective
 Ineffective
 Very ineffective
 Don’t know
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 What can be done to improve the effectiveness in detecting organised criminal 
activity in the fishing industry?
 
 
 
4. Do you believe your State/Territory is effective in dealing with detected organised 
criminal activity in the fishing industry?
 Very effective
 Effective
 Ineffective
 Very ineffective
 Don’t know
 What can be done to improve the effectiveness in dealing with detected organised 
criminal activity in the fishing industry?
 
 
 
5. Do you think that your State/Territory has adequate fisheries legislation to deal 
with organised criminal activity in the fishing industry?
 Very adequate
 Adequate
 Inadequate
 Very inadequate
 Don’t know
 If you believe that your State/Territory legislation is inadequate or very inadequate, 
please state why.
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6. Do you think your OH&S procedures provide a safe environment for compliance 
officers in your area to undertake the full range of tasks required when dealing 
with organised crime?
 Very safe
 Safe
 Unsafe
 Very unsafe
 Don’t know
 How often do you believe this is the case?
 Always
 Most of the time
 On the occasion
 Little of the time
 Never
 If you feel the OH&S procedures do not provide a safe environment, what other/
additional things would you like to have in place?
 
 
 
7.  In your view, indicate how often offenders in your local area use each of the 
following strategies to avoid detection of their fishing-related criminal activity.
Use 
a lot
Use 
sometimes
Use  
a little
Don’t  
use at all
Counter surveillance, e.g. look-outs, or guards
Tampering with vessel monitoring systems
Concealed spaces in boats, vehicles
Pose as legitimate recreational fishers – 
operating alone
Post as legitimate recreational fishers – 
operating in concert with others
Pose as legitimate commercial fishers – 
operating alone
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Use 
a lot
Use 
sometimes
Use  
a little
Don’t  
use at all
Pose as legitimate commercial fishers – 
operating in concert with others
Fisheries documentation fraud
Mixing legal with illegal catch during processing
Mixing legal with illegal catch during 
transportation
Dummy runs
False identification and registrations
Knowledge of fisheries’ officers movement  
and equipment
 
 What other strategies do offenders in your local area use to avoid detection of 
their fishing-related criminal activity? 
 
 
 
8. Please rate the importance of each of the following factors of monitoring and 
dealing with organised criminal activity in the fishing industry.
 Level of importance
highest              lowest
1 2 3 4 5
Financial/human resources
Support resources (vehicles, boats, surveillance equipment)
Personal safety of officers
Attitude of the courts
Skills base of fisheries officers
Dedicated Investigators and Analysts
Intelligence capacity
Access to related legislation: Assets Confiscation Act
Access to related legislation: Surveillance Devices Act
Access to related legislation: Crimes (Controlled Operation) Act
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 Do you think there are other important factors that assist in monitoring and 
dealing with organised criminal activity in the fishing industry?
 
 
 
9. Please rate the importance of each of the following in helping your organisation 
deter organised criminal activity in the fishing industry? 
 Level of importance
highest              lowest
1 2 3 4 5
Surveillance capacity
Number of fisheries officers
Support services (vehicles, boats)
Personal safety of officers
Legislation
Education of the general public
Education of the judiciary
Training for fisheries officers
Inter-agency cooperation
 Do you think there are other important factors that influence the way your 
organisation works to deter organised criminal activity in the fishing industry?
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10. Please rate, in terms of their importance, how changes to or the introduction of 
the following could enhance compliance/police methods and/or powers to deal 
with organised criminal activity in the fishing industry? 
 Level of importance
highest              lowest
1 2 3 4 5
Legislation
Powers for fisheries officers
Cooperation between agencies
Availability of forensic accountants and other specialist services
Secondment of police to fisheries departments
Secondment of fisheries officers to police departments
 What other changes do you think are important? 
 
 
 
11. In your view, what species are most vulnerable to organised criminal activity in 
your local area? (Tick all that apply.)
 Shark
 Rock Lobster
 Prawns
 Perch
 Mud crab
 Dhufish
 Coral trout
 Bluefin tuna
 Barramundi 
 Abalone
 Don’t know
 What other species are vulnerable to organised criminal activity in your local area?
Other 
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12. In the past year, in your view, what proportion of organised criminal activity  
in the fishing industry in your work area/district/region also involved other illegal 
commodities?
 0 – 20 per cent
 21 – 40 per cent
 41 – 60 per cent
 61 – 80 per cent
 81 – 100 per cent
 Don’t know
 Please specify what other illegal commodities may be involved.
 
 
 
13. Do you believe that your work area/district/region is used as a transit point for the 
movement of illegal fish or fish product or other illegal commodities to interstate or 
international locations?
 Frequently
 Sometimes
 Occasionally
 Infrequently
 Never
 Don’t know
14. In your view, how effective is the collaboration between agencies (within State/
Territory or Multi-Jurisdictional) in dealing with organised criminal activity in the 
fishing industry?
Very  
effective Effective Ineffective
Very 
ineffective
Don’t 
know
Within State/Territory
Multi-Jurisdictional  
(between fisheries agencies)
Multi-Jurisdictional  
(including other agencies)
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15. Please rate each of these agencies in terms of how often they refer information 
about criminal activity in the fishing industry to your agency? 
Fr
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nt
ly
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et
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Australian Federal Police
Australian Crime Commission
Australian Customs Service
Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service
Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural and 
Indigenous Affairs
Australian Tax Office
Centrelink
Australian Fisheries Management Authority
Australian Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Director of Public Prosecutions
State/Territory Fisheries Agencies
State/Territory Police Department
 Are there other agencies that refer information about organised criminal activity  
in the fishing industry to your agency? 
 
 
 
16. In your view, are you satisfied these agencies pass on information as a matter  
of routine?
 Very satisfied
 Satisfied
 Dissatisfied
 Very dissatisfied
 Don’t know
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17. Please indicate which of the following factors may inhibit the sharing of information 
between jurisdictions? (Tick all that apply.)
 Lack of formal agreements in place
 Unwillingness of State/Territory authorities to finalise formal agreements
 Unwillingness by other agencies to share information
 Uncertainty about other jurisdictions retaining confidentiality of the information
 Lack of uniform data storage systems between jurisdictions
 Lack of technology to facilitate secure transfer of information
 Legislation
 Privacy Laws
 Don’t know
 Please indicate other factors which may inhibit the sharing of information between 
jurisdictions. 
 
 
 
18. Please indicate which of the following factors may restrict the success of joint 
operations. (Tick all that apply.)
 Legislative differences (including powers of officers)
 Differing priorities
 Limited and varied resource allocation
 Inconsistent position descriptions, rates of pay and conditions of service
 Disagreement over command and control
 Don’t know
 What other factors may restrict the success of joint operations? 
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19. What year were you born in?
Year 
20. Are you male or female?
 Male
 Female
21. What level of formal education have you achieved?
 Year 10 Certificate
 Year 12 Certificate
 TAFE or University Diploma
 Undergraduate degree
 Honours
 Postgraduate Diploma
 Master’s degree
 Doctorate
 Investigation or law enforcement training qualification
 Other qualification (please list) 
22. How many years have you worked in fisheries enforcement?
Years 
23. What type of work are you primarily engaged in?
 Monitoring, surveillance and enforcement
 Compliance supervision/management
 Compliance policy
 Legal or prosecutorial
 Fisheries management
 Investigator
 Other 
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24. Please indicate your level and frequency of involvement in fisheries investigations 
and prosecutions into organised criminal activity, over the last five years.
 Number of instances
Never 1–5 6–10 11–20 More than 21
Officer in charge of an investigation
Team member in investigations
Strategic direction to investigation
Intelligence collection
Intelligence analysis
Legal advice
25. In your view, please indicate what change (if any) has occurred in the duties  
you have carried out in your position, over the last five years? (Please tick all  
that apply.)
Increasing role Decreasing role No change
Law enforcement role
Investigation of criminal activity
Fisheries conservation
Fisheries management 
Compliance
 What other factors have played a lesser or greater role over the last five years? 
 
 
 
26. Please write any additional comments or information in the space provided below.
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The Australian aquaculture and fisheries industry is worth over $2 billion annually,  
and supports numerous communities across the country. This report presents the 
results of research, funded by the Australian Government Department of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Forestry, that sought to investigate the extent of illegal activity in 
Australia’s fishing industry and the threat posed by more organised criminal activity.  
It includes results from a review of legislation, national consultations, a national survey 
of fisheries officers and an analysis of prosecution data. The report concludes with 
recommendations relating to legislative changes, increased resources, intelligence 
sharing between relevant agencies, and specialist skills training for fisheries officers.
